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THE RESCISSION DOCTRINE:
EVERYTHING OLD IS NEW AGAIN
ALLEN SPARKMAN*

This Article considers rescissions-attempts by parties to undo a
transaction and have that undoing respectedfor federal tax purposes.
Some commentators have questioned the legal basis for the rescission
doctrine as applied by the Internal Revenue Service, and others have
arguedfor expansion or restriction of the doctrine. This Article traces
the development of the rescission doctrine, examines a critical article
that argues that there is no legal precedent that truly supports the
rescission doctrine as it is currently applied by the Internal Revenue
Service, considers whether there exists sufficient legal authorityfor the
doctrine as applied by the Internal Revenue Service, and briefly
considers alternatives.
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I. CURRENT INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE POSITION

Since 1980, the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") has approved
rescission treatment for certain transactions that unwind earlier
transactions. Revenue Ruling 80-581 considers two situations.
In Situation 1, in February 1978, A, a calendar year taxpayer, sells a tract
of land to B and receives cash for the entire purchase price. The contract of
sale obligated A, at the request of B, to accept reconveyance of the land
from B if at any time within nine months of the date of sale, B is unable to
have the land rezoned. In October 1978, B determines that it is not
possible to have the land rezoned and notifies A of its intention to reconvey
the land pursuant to the terms of the contract of sale. B reconveys the land
to A during October 1978, and B receives back all amounts that B
expended 2 in connection with the transaction.
Situation 2 is the same as Situation I except that the period within which
B could reconvey the land to A is one year. In January 1979, B determines
that it is not possible to have the land rezoned and notifies A of its intention
to reconvey the land pursuant to the terms of the contract of sale. B
reconveys the land to A during February 1979, and A returns all amounts to
B that B expended in connection with the transaction.
Revenue Ruling 80-58 explained its holdings as follows:
The legal concept of rescission refers to the abrogation, canceling, or
voiding of a contract that has the effect of releasing the contracting
parties from further obligations to each other and restoring the parties to
the relative positions that they would have occupied had no contract been
made. A rescission may be effected by mutual agreement of the parties,
by one of the parties declaring a rescission of the contract without the
consent of the other if sufficient grounds exist, or by applying to the
court for a decree of rescission.
The annual accounting concept requires that one must look at the
transaction on an annual basis using the facts as they exist at the end of
the year. That is, each taxable year is a separate unit for tax accounting
purposes. See Security Flour Mills Co. v. Commissioner, 321 U.S. 281,

88 L. Ed. 725, 64 S. Ct. 596, 1944-1 C.B. 526 (1944), Ct. D. 1603, 1944
C.B. 526.

1. See Rev. Rul. 80-58, 1980-1 C. B 181.
2. This is the language used in Revenue Ruling 80-58. B may have expended

various amounts in connection with the land from A, for example, attorney fees, realtor
commissions, documentary fees, title company fees, etc. Presumably, Revenue Ruling
80-58 requires only that B receive back what he paid to A for the land.
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In Penn v. Robertson, 115 F.2d 167 (4th Cir. 1940), the taxpayer was a
participant in an employees' stock benefit fund created by the directors
of the company without the approval of the shareholders. Under the plan
the taxpayer was credited with earnings from the fund for the years 1930
and 1931. In 1931, as a result of suits filed by a shareholder, the directors
of the company passed a resolution whereby the plan would be rescinded
as to all participants in the plan who agreed to relinquish their previous
credits and rights. The United States Court of Appeals held that although
the plan was rescinded for 1930, the annual accounting period principle
required the determination of income at the close of the taxable year
without regard to subsequent events. That is, the rescission in 1931 was
disregarded for purposes of determining 1930 taxable income. With
regard to whether the 1931 income should be taxed, the Court of Appeals
said in the Penn case that the rescission in 1931 extinguished what
otherwise would have been taxable income for that year.
The facts of the Penn case are similar to those in Situation 1 and
Situation 2. In Penn, earnings were credited in 1930 and 1931 and there
was a rescission in 1931 (that was intended to affect both years).
Situation 1 relates to the earnings credited in 1931, the year of the
rescission; and Situation 2 relates to the earnings credited in 1930, that
is, a year different from the year of the rescission.
In Situation 1 the rescission of the sale during 1978 placed A and B at the
end of the taxable year in the same positions as they were prior to the
sale. Thus, in light of the Penn case, the original sale is to be disregarded
for federal income tax purposes because the rescission extinguished any
taxable income for that year with regard to that transaction. See Rev.
Rul. 74-501, 1974-2 C.B. 98, which holds that there is no adjustment to
the basis of the old stock where a shareholder exercised stock rights and
paid the subscription price for the new stock, which subscription price
was later returned to the shareholder in the same taxable year in which
the rights were issued because the market price of the stock had
depreciated to a price below the subscription offer.
In Situation 2, as in Situation 1, there was a completed sale in 1978.
However, unlike Situation 1, because only the sale and not the rescission
occurred in 1978, at the end of 1978 A and B were not in the same
positions as they were prior to the sale. Again, in light of the Penn case,
the rescission in 1979 is disregarded with respect to the taxable events
occurring in 1978.
In both situations, the annual accounting period principle requires the
determination of income at the close of the taxable year without regard to
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subsequent events. 3
More recently, the IRS restated its view of rescissions in Private Letter

Ruling ("PLR") 2009230104:
The Service recognizes that a rescission may be given full effect in
abrogating a transaction under certain conditions. When these conditions
are met, the transaction is disregarded for federal income tax purposes.
In this connection, Rev. Rul. 80-58, 1980-1 C.B. 181, states the general
legal principles pertaining to the doctrine of rescission in the following
terms:
The legal concept of rescission refers to the abrogation, canceling,
or voiding of a contract that has the effect of releasing the
contracting parties from further obligations to each other and
restoring the parties to the relative positions that they would have
occupied had no contract been made. A rescission may be effected
by mutual agreement of the parties, by one of the parties declaring a
rescission of the contract without the consent of the other if
sufficient Founds exist, or by applying to the court for a decree of
rescission.
The PLR states that there are at least two conditions that must be
satisfied for the remedy of rescission to apply to disregard a transaction for
federal income tax purposes. First, the parties to the transaction must
return to the status quo ante; that is, they must be restored to "the relative
positions they would have occupied had no contract been made." 6 Second,
this restoration must be achieved within the taxable year of the transaction.
The IRS applies the two stated conditions somewhat differently. The
first, that the parties be restored to the relative positions they would have
occupied had no contract been made, appears to be satisfied upon material
compliance. 8 The second condition, that the restoration be achieved within
3. Id.

4. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200923010 (2009).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.

8. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200613027 (2006) (holding that a valid rescission of
the conversion of a partnership to a corporation occurred even though corporate
employees who received stock and were redeemed before the rescission were not
parties to the ruling and presumably were not required to pay back the redemption
proceeds); see also I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2009520036 (2009) (discussing a situation
where a partnership converted to a corporation and, upon learning that the business
purpose it had thought it would achieve if it were a corporation would not be realized,
the corporation converted to a limited liability company. The corporation converted to
a limited liability company because of a change in the state's franchise tax that caused
partnerships no longer to enjoy an advantage over limited liability companies. Both
conversions occurred in the same taxable year, and the IRS ruled that a valid rescission
had taken place even though the former general and limited partners of the partnership
were members of a limited liability company).
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the taxable year of the transaction, appears to be an either/or proposition;
that is, either the condition is satisfied or it is not. If the multiple parties to
a contract have different taxable years, the original transaction and the
rescission apparently have to occur in the same taxable year with respect to
each party. For example, if A purchases Blackacre on March 31, 2014,
from Fiscal Year Corp, which has a taxable year ending March 31, it does
not appear that this sale could be rescinded effective for federal tax
purposes other than on the day of closing because otherwise the rescission
would be in a different taxable year for Fiscal Year Corp. 9 Interestingly, in
Revenue Ruling 80-58, the IRS stated that taxpayer A was a calendar year
taxpayer, but made no statement about the tax year of taxpayer B.1 o
Note that Revenue Ruling 80-58 states that "rescission refers to . .
voiding of a contract."" The IRS apparently does not apply the rescission
doctrine to transactions that do not involve the reversing or undoing of a
contract. Consider, for example, PLR 200925044.12 A taxpayer was
receiving distributions from an Individual Retirement Account ("IRA") that
were intended to be a series of substantially equal periodic payments per
I.R.C. Section 72(t)(2)(A)(iv), in order to avoid a 10% penalty on early
distributions. The taxpayer converted part of the IRA to cash and had it
transferred to a new IRA via a trustee-to-trustee transfer. The IRS
concluded that the partial conversion and transfer of the IRA constituted a
modification of the payment stream, making the penalty applicable." PLR
200925044 held, without any discussion of rescission theory or whether the
retransfer had occurred in the same taxable year, that the consequences of
the modification could not be avoided by causing the transferred amount to
be transferred back to the original IRA.1 4 Where there is a contract, such as
a subscription agreement that is cancelled, the IRS has granted rescission
treatment without a formal rescission designation in the cancellation., 5 In
PLR 2009520036,16 the IRS required the taxpayer to represent that "under
the laws of State A the Plan of Conversion constituted a contract between
and among the parties thereto." 1 7
More recently, for 2012 and 2013, "whether a completed transaction can

9.
(2010)
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201211009 (2012); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201021002
See Rev. Rul. 80-58, supra note 1.
Id. (emphasis added).
See generallyI.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200925044 (2009).
Id.
Id.
See Rev. Rul. 74-501, 1974-2 C. B. 98, Situation 2.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2009520036, supra note 8.
Id.
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be rescinded for Federal income tax purposes" was listed as one of the
issues under study for which rulings would not be issued until the IRS
resolved the issue through publication of a revenue ruling, a revenue
procedure, regulations or otherwise.18 Rescissions are not so listed in
Revenue Procedure 2014-3, but in late June 2013, William Alexander, IRS
Associate Chief Counsel, Corporate, announced that the IRS was
abandoning the guidance project and that the no-ruling policy would stay in
place:
We've put a lot of time, effort, thought into looking at all sorts of aspects
of the rescission doctrine-its history, its fingerprints, its scope, its
relationship to other similar phenomena in the [C]ode ... . And at the
end of this, it appears that where we're going to wind up is where we are
now. And so I would expect that Rev. Rul. 80-58 [1980-1 C. B. 181] will
be the Service's guidance on the subject for the indefinite future, that
rescission will remain a no-rule area for the indefinite future, and that
next year's guidance plan will not show a project on the topic. 19
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE ANNUAL ACCOUNTING CONCEPT

Revenue Ruling 80-58's rationale included its statement that "the annual
accounting concept requires that one must look at the transaction on an
annual basis using the facts as they exist at the end of the year." 2 0 The
annual accounting concept developed after the adoption of the Sixteenth
&

Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in 1913. 2 lln Burnet v. Sanford
Brooks Co.,22 the taxpayer operated a dredging business and from 1913 to
1915, acted as a subcontractor for another company that had a contract with
the United States for dredging the Delaware River.23 On its income tax
returns for 1913-1916, the taxpayer included for each year the payments
received under its subcontract and deducted the expenses it paid each year
for performing under the subcontract. The taxpayer reported net income
for 1914, but the other returns reported net losses. 24
Difficulties arose in the dredging work, and the prime contractor
successfully sued the United States for breach of warranty of the character
of the material to be dredged. From the prime contractor's recovery, the
18. Rev. Proc. 2012-3, 2012-01 I.R.B 113; Rev. Proc. 2013-3, 2013-01
19. IRS Ends Rescission Study, Leaving No-Rule in Effect, 2013 TNT
2, 2013).
20. Rev. Rul. 80-58, supra note 1.
21. U.S. CONST. amend XVI ("The Congress shall have power to lay
taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment
several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration.").
22. 282 U.S. 359 (1931).
23. Id. at 361.
24. See id. at 361.

I.R.B 113.
127-1 (July

and collect
among the
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taxpayer in 1920 received $192,577.59, representing the $176,271.88 by
which the taxpayer's expenses under the contract had exceeded its receipts,
plus $16,305.71 of accrued interest. The taxpayer did not report the
$192,577.59 it received in 1920 for tax purposes, and in its argument
before the Court asserted that the Sixteenth Amendment and the Revenue
Act of 1918 plainly contemplated taxes only on net income or profits and
could not be applied to tax a transaction from which the taxpayer realized
no profit. 2 5
The Court noted that even if the taxpayer's contention was accepted:
[T]he question remains whether the gain or profit which is the subject of
the tax may be ascertained, as here, on the basis of fixed accounting
periods, or whether, as pressed upon us, it can only be net profit
ascertained on the basis of particular transactions of the taxpayer when
they are brought to a conclusion. 26
The Court rejected the taxpayer's contention with observations that have
become part of tax lore:
All revenue acts which have been enacted since the adoption of the
Sixteenth Amendment have uniformly assessed the tax on the basis of
annual returns showing the net result of all the taxpayer's transactions
during a fixed accounting period, either the calendar year, or, at the
option of the taxpayer, the particular fiscal year which he may adopt. 27
A taxpayer may be in receipt of net income in one year and not in
another.... The net result of the two years, if combined in a single
taxable period, might still be a loss; but it has never been supposed that
that fact would relieve him from a tax on the first, or that it affords any
reason for postponing the assessment of the tax until the end of a
lifetime, or for some other indefinite period, to ascertain more precisely
whether the final outcome of the period, or of a given transaction, will be
a gain or a loss.28
The Sixteenth Amendment was adopted to enable the government to
raise revenue by taxation. It is the essence of any system of taxation that
it should produce revenue ascertainable, and payable to the government,
at regular intervals. Only by such a system is it practicable to produce a
regular flow of income and apply methods of accounting, assessment,
and collection capable of practical operation. 29

See id. at 361-62.
26. Id. at 362-63.
27. Id. at 363.
25.

28. Id. at 365.
29. Id.
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In Security Flour Mills Co. v. Commissioner,30 the Court cited and

quoted from Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co. in holding that Security Flour
Mills could not deduct on its income tax return for 1935 payments made by
it in 1936, 1937, and 1938.31 In 1953, the Court again cited Burnet v.
Sanford & Brooks Co. in holding that an individual taxpayer was not
entitled to reduce his salary compensation received in one year because of
repayment of a portion of the salary in a later year.
The Internal Revenue Code now contains exceptions to the annual
accounting concept, such as installment sale treatment,33 and the percentage
of completion method of reporting for certain contracts that will not be
completed during the year that they were entered into.34 In addition, the
Internal Revenue Code affords other relief, such as deductions for
carrybacks and carryovers of net operating losses,35 averaging income from
farming and fishing operations,36 mitigation of limitations, 37 and special
computation of tax when a taxpayer restores more than $3,000 held under a
claim of right.38 Apart from special rules like these, the annual accounting
concept remains fundamental to the income tax system in the United
States.
III. SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT AND ALTERNATIVES
Commentators and the Tax Section of the New York State Bar
Association ("NYSBA") have looked at the rescission doctrine as it has
developed and been applied by the courts and the IRS. On August 11,
2010, the NYSBA Tax Section submitted a report (the "NYSBA
Report"),4 0 urging greater certainty with respect to rescission, and
specifically making the following four recommendations:
30.

321 U.S. 281 (1944).

31.

See id. at 286, n. 9.

32. See Healy v. Commissioner, 345 U.S. 278, 284 (1953) (stating "Congress has
enacted an annual accounting system under which income is counted up at the end of
each year").
33. See I.R.C. § 453 (2012) (Allowing reporting of income as payments are
received under qualifying installment sales).
34. See I.R.C. § 460 (2012).
35. See I.R.C. § 172 (2012).
36. See I.R.C § 1301 (2012).
37. See I.R.C.§§ 1311-14 (2012).
38. I.R.C. § 1341 (2012).
39. See Treas. Reg. § 1.441-l(b)(3) (2002): "Annual accounting period means the
annual period (calendar year or fiscal year) on the basis of which the taxpayer regularly
computes its income in keeping its books."
40. New York State Bar Association Tax Section Report No. 1216 (August 11,
2010) available at http://www.nysba.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=TaxSection
Reports 1 &TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&CONTENTID=43022.
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1. We recommend that Treasury and Service clarify the elements of a
valid rescission for federal tax purposes by, for example, confirming the
practical approach the Service has taken in private letter rulings that the
status quo ante requirement is met where parties are restored to their
prior positions "in all material respects"; addressing the effect that the
making or receiving of additional payments in the course of an "unwind"
might have in this regard; defining the same taxable year requirement in
the event that the parties involved have different tax years; and detailing
whether and to what extent a rescission must be identified as such by the
parties at the time it is undertaken.
2. We believe that, in providing guidance concerning the elements and
effects of a valid rescission, Treasury and the Service should be
especially attentive to the doctrine's application in the context of related
party transactions, unilateral actions or transactions, "partial" rescissions
and cases where the underlying transaction is later "done over."
3. We also believe that the rescission doctrine generally should not be
available to skirt explicit Congressional or Treasury pronouncements
limiting a taxpayer's ability to unwind an election, action or transaction.
At the same time, however, we ask that the Service consider adopting a
more flexible approach in providing administrative relief to correct
oversights, mistakes and execution errors in connection with various
elective regimes, including entity classification elections and Section
83(b) elections.
4. Finally, we recommend that the Service clarify the scope of the
rescission doctrine in the compensation context, identifying in particular
the extent to which common law remedies may be available to
supplement the specific corrections procedures provided in various
administrative pronouncements to correct plan document or operation
"failures" under Section 409A of the Code.
In addition to the clarifying recommendations made by the NYSBA
Report,42 notwithstanding the annual accounting principle, it has been
argued that rescission should be allowed (if otherwise proper) so long as
the statute of limitations for the taxable year of the original transaction
remains open. In addition, and sometimes in the alternative, commentators
have argued that the validity of a rescission should not depend on whether
it falls within the same taxable year as the original transaction, or some
other period, but rather on whether the rescission is entered into because of,
for example, the failure of the parties' expectations for the original
43
transaction. For example, Donald Hasen commented:
[I]f unwinding is viewed as an appropriate remedy, there is no reason to

4 1. Id.
42. Id.
43. See generally Donald Hasen, Unwinding Unwinding, 57 EMORY L.J. 871
(2008).
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limit it in the ways that it is limited under current law. [Allowing]
unwinding relief along the lines available under the claim of right
doctrine and the [tax benefit rule] would seem to do no more violence to
the annual accounting principle or to tax administration more generally
than it does in these areas. Thus, one would hope for both a narrowing
of the rule that permits unwinds for rescissions no matter what the reason
as long as the rescission occurs in the same taxable year, and relaxation
of the rule that limits any unwind to the same taxable year. Any reversal,
to merit unwind treatment, ought to be allowed only if the mistake or
error giving rise to it is justified. When the error is justified, however, it
does not seem that the same-year rule should limit the relief, though it
might modify it. Thus, unwinding presumably could extend both to
reversals that constitute modifications and to reversals in donative
situations or other non-arm's length arrangements under the income tax,
such as tax elections; it would not be limited a priori to rescissions. The
same-year rule might continue to have an effect, however, on the nature
of the relief. Under this partly narrower and partly broader standard, a
same-year reversal that merits unwind treatment could simply result in
complete disregard of both transactions, as under current law. A lateryear reversal meriting unwind treatment could be treated much as a
deduction under the claim of right doctrine or an inclusion under the [tax
benefit rule].44
However one views the policy merits of this argument, in light of the
Court cases discussed supra in Part II, relaxation of the same-year rule for
rescission treatment would appear to require congressional action. On the
other hand, restricting rescission treatment to unwindings that are carried
out because "the mistake or error giving rise to it is justified" would likely
be at least as fact-driven as are determinations whether, for example,
compensation is reasonable. As explained below, this Article takes the
position that the annual accounting concept provides ample legal
justification for the rescission doctrine as articulated by Revenue Ruling
80-58. The annual accounting concept promotes simplicity by providing a
bright-line limitation on rescission treatment.
IV. RECENT CRITIQUE OF RESCISSION DOCTRINE
A. Introduction
In Revenue Ruling 80-58, the IRS based its analysis in part on Penn v.
Robertson,4 5 stating that "the facts of the Penn case are similar to those in

44. Id. at 943-44 (footnote omitted).

45. See 115 F.2d 167 (4th Cir. 1940); see also Sheldon I. Banoff, Unwinding or
Rescinding A Transaction: Good Tax Planning or Tax Fraud?, 62 TAXES 942, 960

(Dec. 1984) (discussing Rev. Rul. 80-58 and Penn v. Robertson).
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Situation I and Situation 2. ,46 Two commentators have mounted an attack
on Revenue Ruling 80-58 and the rescission doctrine it articulates in The
Fabricated Unwind Doctrine: The True Meaning of Penn v. Robertson
(hereinafter, "Fabricated Doctrine").4 7 John Prebble and Chye-Ching
Huang assert that the entire rescission analysis in Revenue Ruling 80-58
lacks any real basis in precedent, that the rescission doctrine is a
"fabrication" by the IRS, that the IRS, practitioners, and academic
commentators have all misunderstood Penn v. Robertson, and that the case,
as analyzed by them, provides no authority for Revenue Ruling 80-58.48
Prebble and Huang 49 take the position that the court in Penn v. Robertson,
far from holding that the taxpayer was entitled to treat the benefit received
from his employer's stock benefit fund in 1931 as "extinguished" when the
establishment of the fund was rescinded in 193 1, actually articulated a
rationale based on allowing the taxpayer's return in 1931 to treat the
repayment of the benefit received from the fund as a deductible payment
offsetting the receipt of a taxable benefit from the fund earlier in 1931.
FabricatedDoctrine recommends that Revenue Ruling 80-58 be revoked
and offers scant comfort to taxpayers who might be disadvantaged as a
result.50

This Article demonstrates that the authors of FabricatedDoctrine have
completely misread Penn v. Robertson, and their conclusions should be
ignored on that basis alone. Penn v. Robertson in fact provides ample legal
support for the rescission doctrine as announced in Rev. Rul. 80-58.
Moreover, this Article argues that, even if Penn v. Robertson had never
been decided, the annual accounting concept provides an ample legal and
policy basis for Revenue Ruling 80-58. The annual accounting concept is a
fundamental principle of United States income tax law established by the
Supreme Court in the cases discussed supra in Part II. Revenue Ruling 8058 cites the annual accounting concept as one of the two grounds (Penn v.
Robertson being the other) for its holdings.

46. Rev. Rul. 80-58, supra, note 1.
47.

John Prebble and Chye-Ching Huang, The FabricatedUnwind Doctrine: The
OF WELLINGTON LEGAL RES. PAPERS,
No. 17/2011 (Sept., 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1781269.
48. Id. at 121.
49. Professor Prebble and Ms.Huang have also written a shorter piece, based in
part on an earlier version of FabricatedDoctrine. John Prebble and Chye-Ching
Huang, The Rescission Doctrine: Clothes Without an Emperor?, TAX ANALYSTS TAX
NOTES TODAY (May 16, 2011) (hereafter "Tax Notes Paper"). Some of the material in
the Tax Notes Paper now appears in the current version of FabricatedDoctrine. This
Article discusses only the current version of FabricatedDoctrine.
50. FabricatedDoctrine, supra note 47, at 163.
51. Rev. Rul. 80-58, supra, note 1.

True Meaning of Penn v. Robertson, VICTORIA U.
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Fabricated Doctrine begins its analysis by making the following
statements:
Taxpayers routinely rely on the unwind doctrine found in Internal
Revenue Service Revenue Ruling 80-58 when they discover that their
transactions have unwanted tax consequences. Nowadays, "unwinding"
has become a "common if not ubiquitous feature of tax practice." This
article finds that the unwind doctrine has no firm basis in case law.
Instead, the unwind doctrine is an Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
fabrication based on the IRS' misinterpretation of the case Penn v.
Robertson.
Also referred to as the "rescission doctrine," a tax "do-over," or a "tax
mulligan," the effect of the unwind doctrine is that if you change your
mind about a transaction, you can avoid its income tax consequences by
returning to the economic status quo ante, so long as you do so by the
end of the tax year.

The Internal Revenue Code, Treasury Regulations, case law, and IRS
rulings do not refer to any unwind doctrine or rescission doctrine by
name.52 The IRS has allowed taxpayers to use unwind treatment to erase
from tax history not only tax effects, such as the derivation of income
from a sale of property but also tax effects such as changes in entity
status, the liquidation of a company, and a company's exit from a
consolidated group. It has allowed unwind treatment when the economic
reversal was motivated by changes in business conditions, and also in
circumstances where the reversal was motivated by tax outcomes that the
parties later came to regret. It has allowed unwind treatment not only
when the unwind was legally connected with the original transaction,
such as a contractual payment rescinded for mistake, but also where the
two transactions were legally independent, such as when two parties
voluntarily reached a fresh agreement to reverse the economic effects of
a completed and legally independent transaction.5 3
The unwind doctrine is attractive to taxpayers because they can use it to
achieve better tax results than would otherwise be possible. Transactions
that cancel each other's economic effects will not necessarily-absent
the unwind doctrine- have tax effects that also cancel each other. For
example, a taxpayer might derive taxable income, but then pay that
amount back later in the year. Without the unwind doctrine, the outgoing

52. FabricatedDoctrine, supra note 47, at 117-18. (footnotes omitted)
53. Id. at 118.
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in the second transaction will offset the tax effect of the first only if it is
deductible in its own right. If the outgoing is not deductible in its own
right, the taxpayer will owe tax as a result of the two transactions, even
though she has economically returned to the status quo ante. By contrast,
under the unwind doctrine, both transactions would be treated as if they
had never occurred, regardless of whether the second outgoing is
deductible. 54

Just in these few statements, FabricatedDoctrine advances questionable
positions. Although this author has not tried to undertake (or to even see if
it is possible) to determine the frequency of taxpayers' use of rescission, a
Westlaw search disclosed only two private letter rulings since 2012 dealing
with rescissions." Thus, it appears questionable whether Prebble and
Huang had objective evidence that the use of rescissions is routine,
common, or ubiquitous. On the other hand, anecdotal evidence suggests
that taxpayers and their advisors are comfortable enough with the
rescission doctrine that they are willing to undertake uncomplicated
rescissions without seeking a private letter ruling. For example, if one
party has sold real estate to another party within the same taxable year and
the parties unwind the transaction, either because a condition in the
contract has not been satisfied, or by mutual agreement because of
economic changes, with the buyer conveying the real estate back to the
seller and the seller returning the purchase price to the buyer, many if not
most experienced tax practitioners would be comfortable advising the
parties that it would be appropriate to take a return position that this was a
valid rescission, i.e., the transaction would not be reported on either party's
return for the applicable year.
Fabricated Doctrine also implies that these "routine" rescission
transactions are undertaken only when taxpayers "discover that their
transactions have unwanted tax consequences[,]"56 and that the effect of the
availability of rescissions is that "if you change your mind about a
transaction, you can avoid its income tax consequences by returning to the
status quo ante, so long as you do so by the end of the tax year." 7 Contrary
to FabricatedDoctrine, many private letter rulings" describe situations
where the parties entered into a rescission transaction for what appeared to
be substantial business reasons. Moreover, saying that one can rescind a
transaction for tax purposes upon a change of mind about a transaction5 is
54. Id. at 118-19.
55. This is unsurprising in light of the developments discussed earlier at notes 1819, supra, and accompanying text.
56. FabricatedDoctrine, supra note 47, at 117.
57. Id. at 117-18.

58. See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2009520036, supra note 8.
59. FabricatedDoctrine, supra note 47, at 117-18.
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a correct statement only if the authors of FabricatedDoctrine are using the
word "you" as a plural noun; the situations described in Revenue Ruling
80-58 involve a sale by one party to another pursuant to a contract that
allowed the buyer to rescind if desired zoning was not achieved. The sales
were rescinded only because both parties had agreed to do so in their
original contracts. However, Revenue Ruling 80-58 states that another way
in which a valid rescission may occur is by mutual agreement.60
Presumably, this mutual agreement to rescind may occur after the initial
sale and does not have to be included in the original contract. If A sells
Blackacre to B in January 2014, and B decides in July 2014 that he doesn't
like Blackacre and wishes he'd never bought it, there's nothing he can do if
A responds negatively to B's request to rescind the sale. If B has grounds
for alleging that A defrauded him, he might bring a suit for rescission, but
even if he is successful and obtains a judgment that the sale, was void
because it was fraudulently induced, he may not receive rescission
treatment for federal tax purposes if the court-ordered rescission does not
occur in 2014.

As discussed above, 62 Revenue Ruling 80-58 contains this statement:
"The legal concept of rescission refers to the abrogation, canceling, or
voiding of a contract that has the effect of releasing the contracting parties
from further obligations to each other and restoring the parties to the
relative positions that they would have occupied had no contract been
made".63
So far as the authors of Fabricated Doctrine are concerned, this
statement does not amount to a reference to the "rescission doctrine" by
name. 64 Would they have thought differently if the ruling had stated "The
legal concept of the rescission doctrine . . ."? Perhaps not, as they assert,

without citing any authority, that "commentators coined the appellation." 6 5
Is not Revenue Ruling 80-58, in fact, a statement of the rescission doctrine,
at least as to Situation 1, in which the rescission took place in the same
taxable year as the original sale?
FabricatedDoctrine's litany of situations in which the IRS has approved
rescission treatment66 is apparently an attempt to show, from a policy
60. Rev. Rul. 80-58, supra, note 1.

61. See, e.g., Banoff, supra note 45 at 967-68 (discussing the rare instances, all
involving adversarial court action, in which an original transaction has been declared
void ab initio and rescission treatment allowed for an unwinding in one year of a
transaction that occurred in a prior year).
62. Rev. Rul. 80-58, supra, note 1.

63. Id.
64. FabricatedDoctrine, supra note 47, at 118.
65. Id.

66. Id.
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standpoint, that the rescission treatment allowed by Rev. Rul. 80-58 is
overbroad. It is difficult to be sure what the point is, because Fabricated
Doctrine does not offer any analysis other than its statements quoted
above, which conclude, in part, with the statement that, absent the
rescission treatment allowed by Rev. Rul. 80-58, "transactions that cancel
each other's economic effects will not necessarily . . . have tax effects that
also cancel each other."6 8 Saying that taxpayers have better results under
Revenue Ruling 80-58 than they would have in its absence does not seem
to an argument against the validity of the ruling. To illustrate its point,
FabricatedDoctrine states: "For example, a taxpayer might derive taxable
income, but then pay that amount back later in the year. Without the
unwind doctrine, the outgoing in the second transaction will offset the tax
effect of the first only if it is deductible in its own right." 69 This statement
by FabricatedDoctrine ignores authorities discussed belowo that would
allow a taxpayer who receives income and repays later in the same year to
exclude the repaid amount from the taxpayer's reportable taxable incomeauthorities that do not rely on Revenue Ruling 80-58.
More importantly, the authors of FabricatedDoctrine do not recognize
the importance of the annual accounting concept in federal tax law. The
annual accounting concept supports, from a policy perspective, allowing
rescission treatment for tax purposes if the unwinding transaction takes
place in the same taxable year as the original transaction. The annual
accounting concept also acts as a brake on rescission treatment for tax
purposes by disallowing such treatment if the unwinding transaction takes
place in a taxable year subsequent to the taxable year of the original
transaction.
The Supreme Court explained the annual accounting concept as follows:
Congress has enacted an annual accounting system under which income
is counted up at the end of each year. It would be disruptive of an

orderly collection of the revenue to rule that the accounting must be done
over again to reflect events occurring after the year for which the
accounting is made.71
Revenue Ruling 80-58 states a similar view in explaining the rationale
for its holdings: "The annual accounting concept requires that one look at
the transaction on an annual basis using the facts as they exist at the end of

67. Id. at 118-19.
68. Id. at 118.
69. Id. at 118 (emphasis in original).
70. See infra Part IV Subsection C Fabricated Doctrine's Examination of TARP
Bonuses.
71. Healy v. Commissioner, 345 U. S. 278, 284-85 (1953) (emphasis added).
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the year."n

If a taxpayer's income is to be determined each year by "counting [it] up
at the end of the year" and "using the facts as they exist at the end of the
year," then why would one not think that rescission treatment is appropriate
for tax purposes if the original transaction and the unwinding transaction
both take place in the same year?
FabricatedDoctrine does not analyze the applicability of the annual
accounting concept or, indeed, even mention it." Nowhere do Prebble and
Huang note that the annual accounting concept was one of the two grounds
(Penn v. Robertson being the other) cited by the IRS for its holdings in
Revenue Ruling 80-58. Fabricated Doctrine's failure to analyze the
applicability of the annual accounting concept may explain why it ignored
authorities discussed infra in Part IV Subsection C74 that would allow a
taxpayer who receives income and repays later in the same year to exclude
the repaid amount from the taxpayer's reportable taxable incomeauthorities that do not rely on Revenue Ruling 80-58.
FabricatedDoctrine analyzes Penn v. Robertson by attempting to show
that the court applied only a deduction rationale in the analysis that led to
its holding.7 5 FabricatedDoctrine then takes a detour to examine the
potential tax results of voluntary repayment of a bonus in the same year as
its receipt, but its analysis is flawed because it assumes deductibility of the
bonus and fails to discuss relevant authorities suggesting that the taxpayer
would get to exclude (not deduct) the bonus from income if the taxpayer
were to repay the bonus in the year of receipt. FabricatedDoctrine then
applies this flawed analysis to argue that the taxpayer might be afforded
rescission treatment under Rev. Rul. 80-58 because of the repayment, even
though it is unlikely that Rev. Rul. 80-58 would be applicable.n This is
another instance in Fabricated Doctrine where the authors describe
supposedly likely or possible results of the rescission doctrine of Revenue
Ruling 80-58 in apparent attempts to demonstrate that Revenue Ruling 80-

72. Rev. Rul. 80-58, supra note 1 (emphasis added).
73. FabricatedDoctrine, supra note 47 at 164 refers to the "tax year accounting
principle in Saunders v. Commissioner." The reference is to Saunders v.
Commissioner, 101 F.2d 407 (10th Cir. 1939). Saunders is a very short opinion in a
claim of right case and does not mention a "tax year accounting principle" or any other
accounting principle or concept.
74. See infra Part IV Subsection C FabricatedDoctrine's Examination of TARP
Bonuses.
75. See infra Part IV Subsection B Fabricated Doctrine's Analysis of Penn v.
Robertson.
76. See infra Part IV Subsection C Fabricated Doctrine's Examination of TARP
Bonuses.
77. See FabricatedDoctrine, supra note 47, at 122; infra Part IV Subsection C.
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58 leads to inappropriate results.7 8
B. FabricatedDoctrine'sAnalysis ofPenn v. Robertson
FabricatedDoctrine states that it has undertaken a close reading of Penn
v. Robertson, and found no support in that case for the unwind doctrine
ascribed to it: 79
This article examines Penn v. Robertson closely in order to determine its
ratio. We find that Penn v. Robertson is not in fact authority for the
unwind doctrine. The IRS in Rev. Rul. 80-58 made two mistakes in
interpreting Penn v. Robertson.80
First, the IRS mistakenly understood Penn as treating two transactions
within the same tax year, which returned the parties to the economic
status quo, as having never occurred. In fact, Penn v. Robertson simply
allowed taxable income derived in a year to be offset by a deduction
generated later in the same tax year. Penn v. Robertson does not sanction
ignoring two economically canceling transactions, nor does it transform
an outgoing that is not deductible in its own right, into a deductible
expense. 81
The second mistake that the IRS made in Rev. Rul. 80-58 was to appear
to extend unwind treatment to cases where the second (unwind)
transaction has no legal connection to the first, rather than restricting it to
cases of true rescissions, that is where the second transaction is legally
connected to the first. 82

These mistakes came about because Revenue Ruling 80-57[sic] and
subsequent private letter rulings made the classic error of confusing the
timing question of when a particular outgoing is deductible with the
substantive question of whether the outgoing is deductible at all.83 Penn
v. Robertson was a "when" case. The issue was whether a certain
outgoing, undeniably deductible in its own right if incurred by the
78.

FabricatedDoctrine supra note 47 at 118 (". . . if A sells 100 shares of stock

to B for $100 and, during the same taxable yeat and before any dividends have been
declared on the stock, the transaction is rescinded such that A receives the stock back
from B and B receives the $100 back from A. A and B will generally be taxed as
though A held the stock for the entire time.").
79. FabricatedDoctrine, supra note 47, at 127-28.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. FabricatedDoctrine, supra note 47 at 119-20.
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taxpayer, should be taken into account for tax purposes in period one
(when the taxpayer Penn was alive) or in period two (after Penn's death).
Penn v. Robertson is authority for the ordinary proposition that an
allowable deduction can offset a taxable gain when both the gain and
deduction occur in the same tax year. It is authority that such an offset
can occur even when the (deceased) taxpayer's executor undertakes the
transaction that gives rise to the deductible outgoing. However, it is not
authority that two economically self-cancelling transactions should be
treated as extinguishing each other for tax purposes, as if for income tax
purposes neither transaction had occurred.84Nor is it authority that a
transaction should be treated as deductible solely on the basis that it
reverses the economic effect of an earlier transaction in which taxable
income was derived.
The IRS' misinterpretation of Penn v. Robertson does not generally
matter for practical purposes (although it is incorrect in law) in cases
where the unwind transaction is also a true rescission. At least in most
cases, when a taxpayer derives taxable income under a contract, then
rescinds the contract, that rescission will inevitably give rise to an
allowable deduction in its own right. The outgoing (repayment) in the
second transaction is legally related to the first outgoing, so the
repayment will necessarily relate to the taxpayer's income-earning
process, which is a touchstone of deductibility. Ordinary principles of tax
law operate to allow the deduction to offset the taxable gain if the two
transactions occur in the same tax year. The result will be no net tax to
pay on the rescinded contract, the same outcome reached under the
unwind doctrine that treats the two transactions as having never
occurred. 86

FabricatedDoctrine defines "true rescissions" as:
that category of unwinds [(any transaction that places the parties in the
economic status quo ante economically)] [sic] in which the unwind
transaction has some legal connection to the original transaction of
which it undoes the economic effect. True rescissions include both
judicially imposed rescissions and unwinds conducted to vindicate a
legal claim embedded in the original agreement between the parties.87
Any "transactions that simply reverse the economic effect of an earlier
transaction, but which are not legally connected to the relevant earlier
84. Actually, that's not exactly what Revenue Ruling 80-58 says happens. As to
Situation 1, Revenue Ruling 80-58 states that "the original sale is to be disregarded for
federal income tax purposes because the rescission extinguished any taxable income for
that year with regard to that transaction." See Rev. Rul. 80-58, supra note 1.
85. FabricatedDoctrine, supra note 47, at 120.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 141.
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transaction" are referred to by FabricatedDoctrine as "reversals." 88
As noted above, FabricatedDoctrine asserts that in its view, Revenue
Ruling 80-58's incorrectness generally does not matter practically in the
case of a true rescission. FabricatedDoctrine also views Situation I in
Revenue Ruling 80-58 as a "true rescission" because the unwinding was
"conducted pursuant to a legal right embedded in the original agreement." 89
At several points, Fabricated Doctrine asserts that it does not matter
whether a transaction like the one in Situation I of Revenue Ruling 80-58
is treated as a rescission because
[a]t least in most cases, when a taxpayer derives taxable income under a
contract, then rescinds the contract, that rescission will inevitably give
rise to an allowable deduction in its own right. ... Ordinary principles of
tax law operate to allow the deduction to offset the taxable gain if the
two transactions occur in the same year.90
If we examine FabricatedDoctrine's assumptions in light of the income
tax results that likely would apply to the parties in Situation I of Revenue
Ruling 80-58 if that transaction were not treated as a rescission, we see that
the "doesn't matter" approach is incorrect. In Situation 1, A sells a tract of
land to B in February, 1978, and receives the full purchase price at closing.
If we view this sale without regard to the later unwinding, A has a gain or
loss equal to the amount by which the purchase price exceeds or is less than
A's basis in the property sold. Unless A is considered a dealer in real
estate, the gain or loss will be a capital gain or loss-a long or short-term
gain depending on A's holding period. B has a basis in the land equal to
the purchase price paid by B. If, in October, 1978, B conveys the property
back to A, and the reconveyance is treated independently for tax purposes
and does not cause the February sale to be disregarded for tax purposes, A
gets the land back with a new basis equal to the purchase price A returns to
B. B has no gain or loss because he has a basis in the land equal to the
purchase price he paid to A in February, assuming that the tract of land was
just land and did not include any depreciable or amortizable assets. If the
conveyance back to A does not cause the sale in February to be disregarded
for tax purposes, what is there in the conveyance back transaction that will
give rise to a deduction for A to offset A's capital gain from the sale in
February? There is nothing; accordingly, it matters greatly to A whether
Revenue Ruling 80-58 is correct.
FabricatedDoctrine continues:
The theme of the following sections is that the holdings in Penn v.
Robertson were wholly concerned with matters of timing, not with
88.

Id. at 143.

89. Id. at 142.
90. Id. at 120; see also id. at 142.
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matters of substantive deductibility. (In later sections, we explain how
the IRS and commentators have erroneously misinterpreted Penn v.
Robertson by taking the case to relate not only to timing but also to
substantive deductibility.) 9 1
All parties, and the Court of Appeals, agreed, and proceeded on the
assumption that the outgoings that were at issue were deductible in their
own right as a matter of substance. The issue in the case related to
timing: in which tax year were those outgoings deductible? And, in
respect of one outgoing, incurred in 1931, was the outgoing deductible
by Mr. Penn, the taxpayer (who died during 1931), or by his executors? 92
Next, one must analyze the assertion that "all parties, and the Court of

Appeals, agreed that the outgoings were deductible." The court in Penn v.
Robertson framed the case as follows:
The Government's present contention is (1) that all the credits on Penn's
note, both for dividends and share of profits, were taxable income in the
years in which they were respectively credited because received by him
under a claim of right and without restriction as to their disposition, and
(2) as the year 1931, the rescission of the transaction voluntarily made by
Penn's executors after his death, although in 1931, could not properly
affect Penn's individual income taxability. On the other hand the
taxpayer's contention is that (with the exception of the 1931 item of
$31,498.14) Penn never actually received any money or benefit from the
credits, and is not chargeable with their constructive receipt, in view of
the invalid and executory nature of the transaction; and as the cash item
of $31,498.14 was returned during the calendar year upon the rescission
of the plan, it was not taxable as income. Thus two questions are
presented for our determination; one, whether the credits on Penn's notes
constituted income constructively received by him for both years, and if
so, second, whether the rescission in 1931 extinguished what otherwise
would have been income to Penn in that year.93
Where in the above quoted statement from the opinion in Penn v.
Robertson is there any suggestion that the court was applying a deduction
rationale?
Judges and practitioners who are discussing whether a
transaction by a taxpayer results in a deduction for income tax purposes do
not generally use words like "whether the rescission in 1931 extinguished
what otherwise would have been taxable income."94 More typically, judges
and practitioners would use language like "as an offset [or reduction] in
taxable income" when discussing a possible deduction.

91. Id. at 127.
92. Id. at 127-28 (emphasis added).
93. 115 F.2d 167, 172-73 (4th Cir. 1940).
94. Id. at 175.
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FabricatedDoctrine continues to argue its assertion as follows:
Only one of the deduction and conflation rationales is the ratio of Penn v.
Robertson. The ratio of a case is the principle of law found in it that has
the force of law as regards the world of [sic] large. The ratio of a case is
not just any rationale that can be used to explain the case's outcome.
Instead, as Goodhart's Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case

explained, the principle of a case is found by taking account of the facts
treated by the judge as material, and his or her decision as based on those
material facts.
Thus, it is important to examine closely how the judges in Penn v.
Robertson both presented the material facts and reached their decision
based on those facts. While the outcome of Penn v. Robertson may be
consistent with the conflation rationale, the way that the judges presented
the facts and their decision show the deduction rationale to in fact be the
ratio of that case.
The reference to Goodhart is to Arthur L. Goodhart's article entitled,
Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case. 96 FabricatedDoctrine cites
Goodhart as though his views establish the gospel for interpretation of case
law. In fact, just a year after its publication, Karl Llewellyn described
Goodhart's article as essentially an indiscretion. 9 7 Discussion and criticism
of Goodhart's views has continued since Llewellyn's disapproval.98
Llewellyn believed that Herman Oliphant failed to see enough guidance in
precedent and that Goodhart saw too much. 99 Robert G. Scofield presents a
persuasive argument that in many common fact patterns, "no matter which
of the two theories of ratio decidendi one adopts, it does not appear that
there is clearly one ratio that states the law. Given the vagueness, ratio
decidendi is a metaphysical concept." 0 0
95.

FabricatedDoctrine, supra note 47 at 130.

96. See generally Arthur L. Goodart, Determiningthe Ratio Decidendi of a Case,
40 YALE L.J. 161 (1930).

97. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Legal Tradition and Social Science Method: A
Realist's Critique, in ESSAYS ON RES. IN THE SOCIAL Sci., THE BROOKINGS INST. 89, 98

(1931).

98. See, e.g., Robert G. Scofield, Goodhart's Concession: Defending Ratio
Decidendiftom LogicalPositivism and Legal Realism in the First Halfof the Twentieth
Century, 16 KING'S C. L.J. 311 (2005); H. K. Liicke, Ratio Decidendi: Adjudicative
Rationale and Source ofLaw, 1 Bond L. REv. 36 (1989); Julius Stone, The Ratio of the
Ratio Decidendi, 22 THE MODERN L. REV. 597 (1959); Arthur L. Goodhart, The Ratio
Decidendi of a Case, 22 THE MODERN L. REv. 117 (1959). Before Goodhart's 1930
article was published, Herman Oliphant published an article taking a contrary position.
Herman Oliphant, A Return to StareDecisis, 14 AM. B. Ass'N J. 71 (1928).
99. Karl N. Llewellyn, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 14 n. 9
(1960).
100. Scofield, supra note 98, at 325.
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It is beyond the scope of this Article to undertake an analysis of the best
way to parse a court opinion. Suffice it to say that, even if Goodhart's
views are applied, FabricatedDoctrine'smisreading of Penn v. Robertson
is astonishing. FabricatedDoctrine asserts that "[f]or Judges Parker and
Chestnut'o' it was material that the payment was deductible" and "in terms
of the court's process of reasoning, deductibility of the repayment was a
material fact." 02 These assertions are unsupportable in light of the court's
actual use of the term "deduction."' 0 3 Fabricated Doctrine attempts to
explain its assertions as follows:
Despite the lack of explicit clarity in the judgment, close reading reveals
four indicators that their Honours implicitly, but nevertheless clearly,
operated under the deduction rationale, the simple subtraction of a
deduction from a gain.1 04
First, the Commissioner assumed that the case was about a
countervailing deduction, not about a conflation. As their Honours
understood it, counsel for the Commissioner submitted that, "the loss to
Penn by the rescission or re-sale could only serve as a deduction against
income received by his executors after his death during the calendar
year."105
Secondly, had the question of conflation of transactions been at issue as
an alternative argument (alternative, that is, to the receipt/deduction
argument just addressed) the Commissioner would surely have submitted
that conflation could not span two tax periods marked off from one
another by Penn's death. After all, he certainly argued that a deduction
could not jump back to the period when Penn was alive (and therefore
could not be considered in Penn's tax position rather than the
executor's). 106
.Yes, the Commissioner did argue that a deduction arising after Mr.
Penn's death could not offset income realized while he was alive, but the
court rejected this argument, stating, inter alia, that the Commissioner's
101. It is not apparent why FabricatedDoctrine claims knowledge of the state of
mind of only Judges Parker and Chestnut. Judge Chestnut wrote the majority opinion
in Penn v. Robertson, in which Judge Dobie joined. 115 F.2d 167, 169 (4th Cir. 1940).
Judge Parker wrote a concurring opinion in which he stated he concurred with the
result and "also in the reasoning of the court, except with respect to grounds upon
which the dividends credited in the year 1930 are taxable income." 115. F.2d at 177
(Parker, J., concurring).
102. FabricatedDoctrine, supra note 47, at 132.

103. Notes 106-114, infra, and accompanying text.
104. FabricatedDoctrine, supra note 47, at 13 1.
105. Id.

106. Id. at 132 (emphasis in original).
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contention was "based on the erroneous assumption that Penn's tax
accounting period ended with his death on October 22, 1931, and was not
for the full calendar year."' 0 7 Given the way appellate arguments are
presented, the Commissioner may not have had the opportunity to present
an alternative argument after the court rejected the argument that 1931
involved two tax years. If he had been able to, then why would the
Commissioner have thought that an argument that a "conflation" could not
"jump back" would have been any more successful? Surely, this tells us
nothing.
FabricatedDoctrine continues:
The court rejected this submission of the Commissioner by holding that
Penn himself, though dead, could take advantage of the loss that
emerged from the rescission. The judges did not explicitly address the
question of whether the loss was a deduction or a cancellation that had to
be conflated with the 1931 credit to make the credit a nullity. Their
Honours did however call the outgoing from the rescission, "a
deduction " and "such deduction. " This indicates that the court was
operating under the deduction rationale (the subtraction of an allowable
deduction from a derived gain) because, under the conflation and
extinction rationale, a deduction would not in fact arise, since the
conflation rationale treats the two transactions together as a nullity. 08
The court in Penn v. Robertson used the terms "deduction" and "such
deduction" only in its discussion of the Commissioner's contention,1 09 as
those are the terms the Commissioner used in his argument. How this
indicates the rationale of the court is not readily apparent. The court in
Penn v. Roberson uses the term "deduction" only in the following
paragraphs:
A minor part of the tax controversy related to deductions from income
made by the taxpayer in the amount of $14,725 for the year 1930, and
$12,271 for 1931, for travel and entertainment expenses. The district
judge determined that these items were properly allowable as deductions
for the respective years, and the Collector does not now further question
them.'10

107. Penn v. Robertson, 115 F.2d 167, 176 (4th Cir. 1940).
108. FabricatedDoctrine, supra note 47, at 131-32 (emphasis added).
109. Robertson, 115 F.2d at 176 (discussing the Commissioner's argument the court
stated that the Commissioner contends that "the loss to Penn by the rescission or re-sale
could only serve as a deduction against income received by his executors after his death
during the calendar year") (emphasis added).
110. 115 F.2d at 167 (emphasis added).
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The market value of the stock on the date of the decedent's death was
$1,798,562.50; the amount then still due on the note amounted to
$1,347,631.48. The equity in Penn's favor at current market price was
then $451,931.02. It may also be noted that in subsequent income tax
accounting the Tobacco Company claimed deductions for the amounts
credited to Penn on the note which, however, were disallowed by the
Commissioner and his ruling was acquiesced in by the Company.

But in view of practical necessities, income tax accounting with the
Government must be on an annual basis, Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks
Co., 282 U. S. 359, 51 S. Ct. 150, 75 L. Ed. 383; Heiner v. Mellon, 304
U.S. 271, 58 S. Ct. 926, 82 L. Ed. 1337; and, therefore, moneys received
by a taxpayer as his own under a claim of right and without restriction as
to their disposition are taxable for the year in which they are received
and retained even though in a later year the taxpayer is obliged to refund
them in whole or in part, in which event he would have a claim for
deduction in the later year.112

The more serious contention made by counsel for the Collector on this
point is that, although Penn's tax accounting was on the cash basis and
for the calendar year, his taxable period ended with his death on October
22d, and what was subsequently done by his executors, even though
done in the same calendar year, cannot affect the matter. To support this
contention, reliance is placed on the provisions of the income tax law
that an individual taxpayer and his estate are separate taxable entities;
and it is argued therefrom that nothing can be done by executors to affect
income chargeable to their decedent within his lifetime, and therefore the
loss to Penn by the rescission or re-sale could only serve as a deduction
against income received by his executors after his death during the
calendar year. In the instant case the tax assessed by the Commissioner
against Penn for 1931 was about $80,000, while the tax payable by the
executors for the balance of the calendar year without such deduction
was only $108.65. No authority is cited in support of the
Commissioner's contention in this respect, and we do not consider it
sound.1 13

As one can see, the first time the court in Penn v. Roberson uses the term

111.
112.
113.

115 F.2d at 171-72 (emphasis added).
115 F.2d at 173 (emphasis added).
115 F.2d at 176 (emphasis added).
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"deduction," it is in the course of discussing an issue that is no longer in the
case. The second time, the court discusses a disallowed deduction of the
American Tobacco Company that had been conceded by the company. The
third time, the court discusses the tax rules that apply when a taxpayer
receives income in one year under a claim of right and is required to repay
the income in a later year; this discussion is not applicable to the court's
decision with regard to 1931 because in that year, which was considered
one taxable year of Mr. Penn notwithstanding his death during the year, the
receipt and repayment of the income happened in the same year. The
fourth and final time the court uses the term "deduction" is in the sole
context of describing the Commissioner's position. These four instances
say nothing about the court's perspective; accordingly, it is not rationally
possible to state that the court in Penn v. Robertson was operating "under
the deduction rationale" on the basis of the court's use of the term
"deduction" in its opinion. 1 14
What the court in Penn v. Robertson did say was: "But we agree with the
district judge that the rescission in 1931 before the close of the calendar
year, extinguished what otherwise would have been taxable income to Penn
for that year."

15

The authors of FabricatedDoctrine acknowledge that the court in Penn
v. Robertson did use rescission language, such as describing the repayment
of the 1931 payment by the taxpayer as a rescission that "extinguished" the
entire stock fund transaction for 1931.
Moreover, the authors of
FabricatedDoctrine, in a paragraph in which they characterize the actions
of the American Tobacco Company and Penn's executors as creating a
deduction, nevertheless state: "Therefore, the reversal in 1931, although
undertaken by Penn's executors after Penn's death, was nevertheless
Penn's. This reasoning had the effect of cancelling the 1931 credit, both
economically andfor tax purposes."1 6 Explaining that the 1931 credit was
cancelled, "economically and for tax purposes" sounds as though they are
describing a rescission. However, FabricatedDoctrine, with no support at
all, goes on to assert that:
Rev. Rul. 80-58 uses the term "extinguished" to mean "ignore both
transactions." But the judges in Penn v. Robertson were using
"extinguished" to mean "completely set off." The outgoing on the
rescission in Penn gave rise to a deduction that completely set off the
income. That outgoing was taken into consideration in the tax year of the
1931 credit because the rescission happened before the taxable period
closed at the end of that year, in short, in the same tax year. Rev. Rul.
114. FabricatedDoctrine, supra note 47, at 131-32.

115. 115 F.2d at 175 (emphasis added).
116. FabricatedDoctrine, supra note 47, at 128 (emphasis added).
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80-58, subsequent IRS rulings, and commentaries reject this possible
interpretation of Penn v. Robertson by ignoring it entirely.117
The Merriam-Webster online dictionary offers several definitions of
"extinguish," including "to bring to an end," "to make an end of," "to cause
to be void," and "to get rid of.""'8 It seems likely that both Revenue Ruling
80-58 and Penn v. Robertson were using "extinguished" in its commonlyaccepted meaning rather than a meaning conjured up to support Fabricated
Doctrine's argument. Moreover, Revenue Ruling 80-58 and subsequent
rulings and commentaries had good reason to ignore Fabricated Doctrine's
"possible interpretation." As discussed earlier, judges and practitioners
who are discussing whether a transaction by a taxpayer results in a
deduction for income tax purposes do not generally use words like
"whether the rescission in 1931 extinguished what otherwise would have
been [taxable] income to Penn in that year.""'9 More typically, judges and
practitioners would use language such as as an offset, or reduction, in
taxable income when discussing a possible deduction.
Fabricated
Doctrine's assertion that the court in Penn v. Robertson employed a
deduction rationale is a fantasy based on imagined language not used by
the court in the way asserted by Fabricated Doctrine. In addition, as
discussed previously,1 20 Revenue Ruling 80-58 did not use the term
"extinguished" to mean "ignore both transactions." Revenue Ruling 80-58
states that "the original sale is to be disregarded for federal income tax
purposes because the rescission extinguished any taxable income for that
year with regard to that transaction."'21
Moreover, if "the conflation rationale treats the two transactions as a
nullity," is that not what the court in Penn v. Robertson did when it stated
that "we agree with the district judge that the rescission in 1931 before the
close of the calendar year, extinguished what otherwise would have been
[taxable] income to Penn for that year"? 22 However, on facts like those in
Situation 1 of Revenue Ruling 80-58, it is incorrect to assert that the
"conflation rationale treats the two transactions together as a nullity". In
Situation 1 of Revenue Ruling 80-58, the reconveyance of the property by
B to A in October 1978 extinguishes the taxable gain to A from the sale by
A to B in February 1978. The sale in February 1978 is disregarded for tax
purposes, but the reconveyance is what makes the rescission work. The

117. Id. at 140. (emphasis added).
118. Merriam Webster Dictionary http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
extinguish.
119. 115 F.2d at 173.
120. FabricatedDoctrine, supra note 47, at 119-20.
121. Rev. Rul. 80-58, supra note 1.
122. 115 F.2d at 175 (emphasis added).
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reconveyance is not a nullity. Nor is the February 1978 sale a nullity for
state law purposes. B may have some potential liability (for example under
environmental laws) arising from his period of ownership.
FabricatedDoctrine also tells us that:
[H]ad the Commissioner submitted that a conflation could not span two
periods their Honours would have recorded their response in their
judgment, but they did not. The reason is clearly that counsel for Penn
did not argue that the case was one of conflation, but was satisfied to
argue the case as one of a deduction offsetting an earlier receipt.1 23
Counsel for taxpayer in Penn v. Robertson made several arguments: (1)
with the exception of $31,498.14 in 1931, Mr. Penn never actually received
any money, or benefit from the credits, and should not be charged with
constructive receipt; 124 (2) there was no constructive receipt of income by
Mr. Penn because the stock allotment plan of 1929 was wholly invalid and
void ab initio;125 (3) with the exception of the $31,498.41 in cash in 1931,
the whole plan remained executory until it was finally abandoned, and
therefore, Mr. Penn didn't have constructive income;12 6 and (4) a credit of
$90,702.80 should be taxed, if at all, in 1929, not 1930, and a credit of
$181,708.12 should be taxed, if at all, in 1930, not 1931
Based on the foregoing description from the opinion in Penn v.
Robertson of the arguments made by the taxpayer's counsel, the assertion
that the taxpayer's counsel "was satisfied to argue the case as one of a
deduction offsetting an earlier receipt" is untenable. If possible, there is
even less support for Fabricated Doctrine's assertion than for the
assertions that deductibility was material to the court, as the taxpayer's
counsel did not use the term "deduction" at all in his arguments. Indeed,
when the court framed the issues for decision, it reported the taxpayer's
position as follows:
[T]he taxpayer's contention is that (with the exception of the 1931 item
of $31,498.14) Penn never actually received any money or benefit from
the credits, and is not chargeable with their constructive receipt, in view
of the invalid and executory nature of the transaction; and as the cash
item of $31,498.14 was returned during the calendar year upon the
rescission of the plan, it was not taxable as income.128
Where in this, or in the earlier quote of the court's summary of both

123. FabricatedDoctrine,supra note 47, at 132 (emphasis added).
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

115 F.2d at 172-73.
Id. at 173.
Id. at 174.
Id. at 177.
Id. at 172-173.
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parties' positions,1 29 is there any word remotely suggesting that the court or
taxpayer's counsel was operating under a deduction rationale?
FabricatedDoctrine offers additional arguments:
The third reason for concluding that Penn v. Robertson did not involve
the conflation rationale is that this interpretation would require accepting
that the judges chose to make new law, even though they could have
reached the same result via the established and perfectly ordinary route
of subtracting a deduction from income.1 30

'

There were two transactions relevant to this particular issue: the crediting
transaction, the 1931 credit to Penn in his lifetime, and the repayment
transaction, the outgoing that the executors incurred months later. Both
events were relevant for income tax purposes. To treat the credit as a
receipt and the repayment as a deduction requires no magic, no new law.
That is how income tax works: on net results. Indeed, the court used the
expression, "net profit."' 3

The court in Penn v. Robertson uses the term "net profit" as follows:
At the outset of the discussion it should be noted that the tax
controversy exists only because the stock allotment plan was
initiated in 1929 and abandoned in a subsequent tax year. If the plan
had been terminated during Penn's lifetime in. the same tax year that
it originated, it is obvious that there would have been no tax, as
there was no net profit. On the items in controversy the
Commissioner has made tax assessments of about $90,000, which
the taxpayers have paid, and the Government contends may not be
recovered although the transaction resulted in no net profit.
It is hard to see how the court's use of the term "net profit" in this
context has any relevance to the argument asserted by FabricatedDoctrine.
Moreover, in 1929, the value of the stock allotted to the directors of the
American Tobacco Company exceeded the cost price to the recipients by
close to $2,000.000.'13 If the plan terminated in 1929, saying that there
would be "no net profit" sounds as though one would be describing a
rescission. Moreover, Fabricated Doctrine's assertion that income tax
works on net results is correct only if it is understood to mean "net results

129. FabricatedDoctrine, supra note 47, at 127-28.
130.
131.

Id. at 132.
Id.

132.

115 F.2d at 173 (emphasis added).

133.

See 115 F.2d at 173.
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within a taxable year." The taxpayer in Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co. 134
argued that the Sixteenth Amendment prohibited taxation of a transaction
on which there was no net profit, but the Court held that net profit must be
computed on the basis of the annual accounting period, even if that
produces a taxable profit in one or more tax years from a transaction that
does not produce a profit overall.
FabricatedDoctrine continues:
On the other hand, to conclude that the court adopted the conflation
rationale one has to assume that for some reason their Honours believed
that it was necessary for the court to hold innovatively that some
alchemy had operated to conflate the two transactions and to leave them
a fiscal nullity as well as being an economic nullity. This conclusion also
requires one to believe that the court would have adopted this innovation
without explicitly noting that it had done so. 35
It appears likely that the court did not think it was adopting an
innovation. The cases discussed supra in Part II support the proposition
that taxable income for each tax year is determined by computing net
results at the end of the year. Moreover, although FabricatedDoctrine
ignores it, Revenue Ruling 80-58 included in its legal analysis the
statement that "the annual accounting concept requires that one must look
at the transaction on an annual basis using the facts as they exist at the end
of the year. That is, each taxable year is a separate unit for tax accounting
purposes."' 36

Again, from FabricatedDoctrine:
Fourthly, if the conflation rationale is correct it is an invention of tax law
that has no counterpart in the general law. Ordinarily, tax law is part of
and reflects the rest of the law. Where tax creates its own special rules
the courts point this out. For instance, Judges Parker and Chestnut took
care to explain that Penn was taxable on the 1930 credit to him, and why
this was so, even though the credit to him was void. They summarized
the reason in these terms:
But while we regard the [share purchase] plan as void . .
[c]onstructively received income is taxable when the amount is
definitely liquidated and available to the taxpayer without
restriction. The circumstances under which the credits were made
met these conditions. The credits were precise in amount and were
absolutely made as reductions of the notes.
It would have been much more radical for their Honours to say that for
tax purposes a rescission makes a nondeductible expense deductible.
134. See Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359, 361-62, 365 (1931).
135. FabricatedDoctrine, supra note 47, at 132-33.
136. Rev. Rul 80-58, supra note 1 (citing Security Flour Mills Co. v.
Commissioner, 321 U.S. 281 (1944)).
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Considering how carefully they explained the constructive receipt rule
that tests derivation for tax purposes, which had by then been established
law for years, it is inconceivable that they would have laid down a
completely fresh rule without explaining their reasons.137
It is entirely unclear what point the authors of FabricatedDoctrine are
trying to make with some of their statements quoted above. What does it
mean to say that "[o]rdinarily, tax law is part of and reflects the rest of the
law. Where tax creates its own special rules the courts point this out."?
Experienced practitioners have always believed that tax, securities, and
corporate and alternative entity law all have their specific concerns, are not
consistent, and in no sense can be said to be a part of one another. What
can the authors of FabricatedDoctrine possibly mean by "if the conflation
doctrine [i.e., rescission] is correct it is an invention of tax law that has no
counterpart in the general law."? What is general law? Is not tax law part
of whatever general law is? Moreover, rescission is recognized in other
areas of the law." 8 If rescission is an invention of tax law, why has it been
defined by Black's Law Dictionary and discussed by treatises such as
Corbin on Contracts as though it is part of everyday contract and other
areas of law?1 39 The authors of FabricatedDoctrine know this because they
discuss how leading contract treatises disagree about the precise definition
of the term "rescission." 4 0
FabricatedDoctrine attempts to buttress its argument by stating the
following:
Now, examine the issue in terms of Goodhart's analysis of ratio and
material facts. For Judges Parker and Chestnut,141 it was material that the
repayment was deductible. ("That the repayment was deductible"
appears on its face to be a conclusion of law, rather than the statement of
a fact. However, in the context of the tax question at issue in Penn v.
Robertson the deductibility of the repayment was a matter of fact on
which the court built its conclusion of law). Taking it that the repayment
was deductible, the court moved to the issue before it: could Penn's
estate take advantage of the deduction notwithstanding that he had died

137. FabricatedDoctrine, supra note 47, at 133.
138. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (2012) (providing a right of rescission in certain
credit transactions).
139. See Banoff, supra note 45, at 957.
140. FabricatedDoctrine, note 47, supra, at 141.
141. As noted earlier, at note 100, supra, and accompanying text, it is not apparent
why FabricatedDoctrine claims knowledge of the state of mind of only Judges Parker
and Chestnut. Judge Chestnut wrote the majority opinion in Penn v. Robertson, in
which Judge Dobie joined. Compare Penn v. Robertson,l 15 F.2d 167, 169 (1940) with
115 F.2d at 177 (Parker, J., concurring), where Judge Parker stated he concurred with
the result and "also in.the reasoning of the court, except with respect to grounds upon
which the dividends credited in the year 1930 are taxable income."
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before the repayment was made? That is, in terms of the court's process
of reasoning, deductibility of the repayment was a material fact. It
follows that we cannot extract authority from Penn v. Robertson that in
the circumstances of the case, and for tax purposes, the repayment was
extinguished. Since extinguishment of the second of a pair of
transactions is crucial to the unwind doctrine, it follows that Penn v.
Robertson is not authority for that doctrine.1 42
As explained above,1 4 3 nothing in the opinion in Penn v. Robertson
supports Fabricated Doctrine's assertions in the paragraph quoted
immediately above. The opinion provides absolutely no indication that the
court was acting under a deduction rationale or that the deductibility of the
repayment was material. Moreover, to speak of the repayment being
extinguished and that "extinguishment of the second of a pair of
transactions is crucial to the unwind doctrine" is nonsense. As discussed
earlier, the authors of FabricatedDoctrine do not appear to understand the
meaning of "extinguished," and the rescission could not be extinguished or
disregarded if it was to have the effect of causing the transaction to be
disregarded for tax purposes.144
C. FabricatedDoctrine'sExamination of TARP Bonuses
Having presented what can be seen as a Pollyannaish analysis of "true
rescissions,"1 4 5
and
an
egregious
misreading
of Penn
v.
Robertson,146Fabricated Doctrine then attempts to illustrate the policy
short-comings of Revenue Ruling 80-58 by examining what it views as the
possible income tax treatment available to Douglas Poling, who, in 2009,
received a $6.4 million bonus from AIG, which AIG paid out of funds it
had received from the Troubled Assets Relief Program ("TARP").1 47
Following great public outcry and threatened federal legislation to impose
punitive taxes on such "TARP bonuses," in March 2009, Poling announced
that he would repay his bonus "because [he]. thought it was the correct
thing to do." 48 The authors of FabricatedDoctrine assume for purposes of
their paper that Poling's repayment would not be deductible.1 4 9 They state
that, if Poling repaid his bonus in 2009 (the year of receipt) the preparer of
Poling's tax return would have to determine the correct income tax
142.

FabricatedDoctrine, supra note 47, at 132.

143. Notes 105-113, supra, and accompanying text.
144. Id.
145. FabricatedDoctrine, supra note 47 at 144.
146. See supra Part IV Subsection B Fabricated Doctrine's Analysis of Penn v.
Robertson.
147. See FabricatedDoctrine, supra note 47, at 122.
148. Id. at 123-24.
149. See id.
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treatment of the receipt of the bonus and its repayment, and that the answer
to this would "depend[] on Rev. Rul. 80-58, and the correct meaning of the
ruling's purported authority, Penn v. Robertson." 50
Actually, Mr. Poling undoubtedly would have engaged a competent
return preparer, who would not have spent any time worrying about
Revenue Ruling 80-58 and whether it is in fact supported by Penn v.
Robertson but instead would have excluded the bonus from Poling's
reported taxable income pursuant to the authority of Revenue Ruling 79311.151 Revenue Ruling 79-311 holds that if an employee repays
compensation in the year of receipt the amount repaid is "excludible from
[the employee's] gross income in the year of repayment."' 5 2 Although the
repayments in Revenue Ruling 79-311 were required by the relevant
employment contract, the IRS views Revenue Ruling 79-311 as extending
to voluntary repayments.' 53 In addition, IRS Publication 525: Taxable and
Nontaxable Income, also states that "if you repay unearned commissions or
other amounts in the same year you receive them, reduce the amount
included in your income by the repayment." IRS Publication 525 does not
treat a repayment in the year of receipt as a deduction. Moreover, Mr.
Poling would be able to exclude from income any portion of his TARP
bonus repaid in the year of receipt under Fender Sales, Inc. v.
Commissioner,154 where the court held that petitioner C. Leo Fender was
not taxable on bonus payments received in 1956 and 1957 to the extent he
voluntarily returned such bonuses to his employer in the year of receipt.
Specifically, the court stated:
This Court has adopted and consistently followed the legal proposition
that where prior to the close of the taxable year there has been an
adjustment of the contract or obligation and a repayment of a portion of
the amount received, the tax liability is to be determined on the basis of
such adjusted amount. 155

FabricatedDoctrine does not discuss Fender Sales in connection with
its consideration of Mr. Poling's tax situation, but it does discuss it with the
cases discussed below.' 56 FabricatedDoctrine asserts that the result in that
150. Id. at 124.
151. Rev. Rul. 79-311, 1979-2 C. B. 25.
152. Id. (citing Couch v. Commissioner, 1 B.T.A. 102 (1925)).
153. See Treasury Information Letter 2005-0146 (September 30, 2005), (stating:
"The repayment results in a reduction in gross income and wages rather than a
deduction. See Couch v. Commissioner, 1 B.T.A. 103 (1924), acq., IV-1 C. B. 1
(1925)").
154. 22 TCM (CCH) 550 (1963), rev'd on other grounds, 338 F.2d 924 (9th Cir.
1964).
155. See id. at 560-61.
156. See infra, Part IV Subsection D Fabricated Doctrine's Discussion of Other
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case "seems superficially consistent with the mistaken interpretation of
Penn v. Robertson," but that "it is not. . . compelling." Fabricated
Doctrine also states that "the court in Fender cites, but does not rely on,
Penn v. Robertson," instead appearing to create "a special rule when a
reversal transaction will be considered deductible in its own right: namely
in circumstances where both transactions involve a company and a
principal shareholder in that company who is also an employee.""'
The court in Fender Sales cited previous decisiohs of the U.S. Tax Court
and its predecessor, the Board of Tax Appeals, as direct authority for its
statement quoted above. The court cites Penn v. Robertson in a citation of
opinions that are described by the court as "adher[ing] to a similar
position." It would seem at least arguable that this is demonstrative of
"reliance" on Penn v. Robertson. The court in Fender Sales certainly gave
no indication in its opinion that it thought it was creating a special rule,
particularly one that would apply only where the taxpayer in effect was on
both sides of the unwinding.
Cases.
157. FabricatedDoctrine, supra note 47, at 149.
158. See John W. Lee, Tax TARP Needed for Year One and Year Two Returns of
Executive Bonuses to TARP Recipient: A Case Study of Year One Rescission/Exclusion
from Income and Year Two Deduction Under Section 1341 1 WM. & MARY L. REv.
323, 376-77 (2010); there Mr. Lee states:
By the 1940s the Tax Court had come to flatly stating the rule as follows:
[C]ompensation for services of officers of corporations for any period is
subject to modification either by corporate action or by agreement at any
time and from time to time during the taxable year and the amount at
which compensation is finally adjusted at the close of the taxable year is
the amount which the officer must report as compensation or the
corporation may deduct as ordinary and necessary business expense.
[citing, at note 245, McEwen v. Commissioner, 6 T. C. 1018, 1025 (1946).]
The Tax Court has applied this exception to modifications where the payment
of compensation was neither in error nor subject to conditions
subsequent.[citing, at note 246, Fender Sales.]
Similarly, the Service often flatly states the rule to be that a taxpayer's gross
income includes the amount of compensation set forth in a renegotiated
employment contract rather than the amount of compensation set forth in an
original employment contract where the renegotiated employment contract is
bona fide and legally binding on the parties. Furthermore, the Board of Tax
Appeals, the Tax Court, and the Service are generally in agreement that the
renegotiated employment contract must be executed and the resulting salary
adjustments must be implemented prior to the close of the taxpayer's taxable
year.[citing, at note 247, I. R. S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem., 1994 FSA LEXIS 5
(Oct. 18, 1994.)
The Service reasoned that:
[w]here both the initial receipt of funds and the repayment of some portion
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In addition, Mr. Poling's tax return preparer could rely on Bishop v.
Commissioner.15 9 In that case, the petitioner was a shareholder of Pendleton
Woolen Mills. Another shareholder had asserted a claim against the
petitioner and other shareholders who were diverting business from the
corporation and using its name in partnerships that the petitioner and the
other shareholders had formed. The shareholder's claims against petitioner
and the other shareholders involved in the partnership were settled in an
agreement entered into on December 31, 1946 and approved by the
corporation's board of directors on the same day. Also, on December 31,
1946, pursuant to the agreement, the partnerships were terminated and all
of their 1946 income was transferred to the corporation. The Tax Court
held for the petitioner, agreeing that all of the partnerships' 1946 income
was taxable to the corporation, stating:
We recently considered the application of the claim of right doctrine in
Michael Phillips, 25 T. C. 767. Briefly, the petitioners assert that the
directors of a corporation cannot retain income gained personally from a
deal with the assets of the corporation, citing Enyart v. Merrick, 148 Ore.
321, 34 P.2d 629, and that under the facts here Pendleton was entitled to
this partnership income. The next step in petitioner's argument is that
where the alleged income is restored to the rightful owner in the same
taxable year it is received, then the income is not taxable to the original
recipient.
The petitioners' contention is supported by authorities. The 'claim of
right' doctrine had its origin in North American Oil Consolidated v.
Burnet, 286 U.S. 417. In general, it charges the recipient with the receipt
of income when he asserts a claim it is his even though his claim later
proves to be invalid. There is no need to go into a general discussion of
the claim of right doctrine for actually here the question is as to the tax
consequences when in the year of receipt the claim of right is renounced
and the income repaid to its rightful owner. The applicable rule was
recently stated in the following quotation from United States v. Merrill,
211 F.2d 297:
We are not aware that the rule has ever been applied where, as here,
in the same year that the funds are mistakenly received, the taxpayer
discovers and admits the mistake, renounces his claim to the funds,
and recognizes his obligation to repay them. Cf. Carey Van Fleet, 2
B. T. A. 825; CurranRealty Co. v. Commissioner, 15 T. C. 341. We
thereof take place in the same year, there cannot very well be a serious
question about the overall propriety of excluding the amount so repaid
from the taxable income of the party who has thus effectively relinquished
or disavowed any claim thereto.[citing, at note 248, I. R. S. Gen. Couns.
Mem. 33,602 (Aug. 25, 1967.]
159.

25 T.C. 969 (1956).
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think there is no warrant for extending the harsh claim of right
doctrine to such a situation. In such case the Internal Revenue
Bureau is not faced with the problem of deciding the merits of the
claim to the funds received, for the question has been resolved by
the interested parties.1 60
Returning to Fabricated Doctrine, the authors tell us that Poling's
situation drives them to examine whether Rev. Rul. 80-58 would allow
Poling to exclude his TARP bonus from income if he repays it. They state
that they will now:
[E]xplain what Penn v. Robertson does and does not stand for, and show
how Rev. Rul. 80-58 misinterprets Penn v. Robertson. On a correct
interpretation of the law, taxpayers like Mr. Poling would owe tax on a
bonus even if they had returned it. The bonus receipt would be taxable,
the repayment we assume is not deductible, and no special tax rule
would apply to allow the transactions to nullify each other for tax
purposes.
FabricatedDoctrine is probably correct in its assumption that Poling's
repayment of his bonus would not be deductible, because, as explained
above,1 62 the amount repaid in the year of receipt would be excluded from
his income on the basis of authorities other than Rev. Rul. 80-58,
authorities either not discussed at all by Fabricated Doctrine or not
discussed in connection with Mr. Poling's situation.
In its discussion of the potential tax treatment of Douglas Poling,
Fabricated Doctrine assumes away any potential deductibility of a
repayment by Mr. Poling of his TARP bonus, fails to discuss the authorities
discussed abovel 6 3 that show that if Mr. Poling did repay his TARP bonus
in the year of receipt, he would be allowed to exclude the repaid bonus
from his taxable income for that year, and wrongly states that Mr. Polling
would likely be entitled to treat repayment as a rescission under Revenue
Ruling 80-58. FabricatedDoctrine states that "[i]t has been asserted that
the unwind doctrine in Rev. Rul. 80-58 saves Poling from a net tax impost
in respect of his returned bonus, even if under ordinary tax principles the
receipt of the bonus is taxable and its return not deductible."l 64 For its
statement that "it has been asserted that . .. Rev. Rul. 80-58 saves Poling,"
FabricatedDoctrine states "The authors again thank unnamed United
States colleagues1 6 5 who suggested that reliance on revenue rulings would
160.

Id. at 974.

161. FabricatedDoctrine, supra note 47, at 127.
162. Note 153, supra, and accompanying text.
163. Note 153, supra, and accompanying text.
164. FabricatedDoctrine, supra note 47, at 127.
165. FabricatedDoctrine did thank certain colleagues by name for reviewing the
article. See id. at 117, n. 1.
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lead to the result that Poling would pay no net tax."' 66 It is unfortunate that
FabricatedDoctrine could not name these colleagues so that others could
know just what revenue rulings they were referring to. As discussed
earlier, there are cases and a published revenue ruling that are not
rescission authorities, but are based on the annual accounting concept and
indicate that Mr. Poling would be entitled to exclude his TARP bonus from
income if he repaid it in the year of receipt.
FabricatedDoctrine states:
If the IRS continues to follow and apply Rev. Rul. 80-58 as it has, both
Poling's receipt of the bonus and his return of it to AIG would be treated
for tax purposes as if they had not occurred. He would not have to
acknowledge either transaction on his income tax returns. This is a far

more attractive result for Poling than that reached under ordinary tax
principles, which would require him to pay tax on a bonus that he does
not keep.1 67

Despite Fabricated Doctrine's concern that Revenue Ruling 80-58
would save Mr. Polling, this Article demonstrates that several authorities
not discussed in FabricatedDoctrine would give Mr. Polling his desired
tax treatment without application of Revenue Ruling 80-58.168 Moreover,
because Mr. Polling's repayment of his TARP bonus likely would not be
considered the undoing of a contract, there exists considerable doubt
whether the IRS would apply Revenue Ruling 80-58 to his situation
because of the IRS requirement that rescission means the rescission of a
contract.1 69 FabricatedDoctrine apparently goes on at such length about
Mr. Poling's situation because the authors viewed Mr. Poling as the poster
child for, what they believed to be, inappropriate relief that Revenue Ruling
80-58 would afford him when "ordinary tax principles" would not save
him. Of course, as this Article explains, ordinary tax principles other than
Revenue Ruling 80-58 would very likely have provided Mr. Poling with
the tax treatment he presumably desired.170
D. FabricatedDoctrine'sExaminationof Other Cases
From its misanalysis of Douglas Poling's tax situation, Fabricated
Doctrine moves on to a discussion of other cases and makes much of the
point that they could find no subsequent case that the authors believed
clearly cited Penn v. Robertson or relied on it to treat an unwinding as a
rescission. In the minds of the authors of Fabricated Doctrine, this
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 127, n. 50.
FabricatedDoctrine, supra note 47, at 148 (footnotes omitted).
See Note 153, supra, and accompanying text.
See Note 11, supra.
See Note 153, supra, and accompanying text.
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indicates that Penn v. Robertson is not really a rescission case. They fail to
discuss the possibility that there are no such cases because the IRS didn't
challenge cases that involved unwindings in the same tax year. Cases
involving a taxpayer's attempts to reduce income in one year because of
events in a later year are decided as claim of right cases, not rescission
cases. Prebble and Huang discuss the following cases, apparently on the
theory that it demonstrates that the later cases did not directly rely on Penn
v. Robertson, that bolsters their argument that Penn v. Robertson is not a
rescission case.
This Article has already discussed Fender Sales, Inc. v.
Commissioner.17 ' There, the court held that petitioner C. Leo Fender was
not taxable on bonus payments received in 1956 and 1957 to the extent that
he returned such bonuses to his employer in the year of receipt. The court
stated:
This Court has adopted and consistently followed the legal proposition
that where prior to the close of the taxable year there has been an
adjustment of the contract or obligation and a repayment of a portion of
the amount received, the tax liability is to be determined on the basis of
such adjusted amount. 172

Although certainly not a literal rescission case, Fender Sales,
nevertheless is completely consistent with the rescission doctrine that has
developed since Penn v. Robertson. FabricatedDoctrinediscusses Fender
Sales by stating that the result in that case "seems superficially consistent
with the mistaken interpretation of Penn v. Robertson." Fabricated
Doctrine then asserts that "it is not . .. compelling." FabricatedDoctrine
states that "the court in Fender cites, but does not rely on, Penn v.
Robertson," and appears to "create a special rule when a reversal
transaction will be considered deductible in its own right: namely in
circumstances where both transactions involve a company and a principal
shareholder in that company who is also an employee."' 3 The court in
Fender Sales cited previous decisions of the U.S. Tax Court and its
predecessor, the Board of Tax Appeals, as direct authority for its statement
quoted above. The court cites Penn v. Robertson in a citation of opinions
that are described by the court as "adher[ing] to a similar position." It
would seem at least arguable that this is "reliance" on Penn v. Robertson.
The court in Fender Sales certainly gave no indication in its opinion that it
thought it was creating a special rule, particularly one that would apply

171.

22 TCM (CCH) 550 (1963), rev'd on other grounds, 338 F.2d 924 (9th Cir.

1964). See note 157, supra, and accompanying text.
172. 22 TCM (CCH) at 560.

173. FabricatedDoctrine, supra note 47, at 149.
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only where the taxpayer was in effect on both sides of the unwinding. 174
FabricatedDoctrine discusses three opinions that were reversed by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Lewis,' 75 a claim of right case that
unsurprisingly held that a taxpayer who received a $22,000 bonus in 1944
was taxable on the full amount in 1944, even though he was required to pay
back $11,000 of the bonus in 1946. The taxpayer's repayment in 1946 was
deductible in 1946. Inasmuch as there exists no legal authority holding that
an unwinding that spans two or more taxable years can normally be treated
as a rescission for federal income tax purposes, Lewis hardly represents a
case that rejects the rescission doctrine, and is consistent with the holding
of Penn v. Robertson as to the tax year 1930.176
FabricatedDoctrine discusses three lower court opinions, Gargaro v.
United States,177 Lewis v. United States,'78 and Haberkorn v. United
States.17 9 All three cases involved employees who had received bonuses in
one year and were required to return a portion of the bonus in a later year.
The U.S. Court of Federal Claims in Gargaro and Lewis allowed the
taxpayer to reopen his tax return for the year of receipt of the bonus.
Haberkorn, following North American Oil Consolidated v. Burnet,' held
that the taxpayer could only deduct the repayment in the year of the
repayment. The Supreme Court, in its opinion in United States v. Lewis,
reversed the U.S. Court of Federal Claims decisions and affirmed
Haberkorn. None of this is remarkable-all of this flowed from the claim
of right doctrine that was established by North American Oil Consolidated
and was followed in several later cases, including Penn v. Robertson (as to
the tax year 1930). As the Court stated in United States v. Lewis:
In the North American Oil case we said: "If a taxpayer receives earnings
under a claim of right and without restriction as to its disposition, he has
received income which he is required to return, even though it may still
be claimed that he is not entitled to retain the money, and even though he
may still be adjudged liable to restore its equivalent."

174. See Lee, supra note 157.
175. 340 U.S. 590 (1951).

176. Banoff, supra note 45, at 967-68 (discussing the rare instances, all involving

adversarial court action, in which an original transaction has been declared void ab
initio and rescission treatment allowed for an unwinding in one year of a transaction

that occurred in a prior year).
177. 73 F. Supp. 973 (Ct. Cl. 1947).

178. 91 F. Supp. 1017 (Ct. Cl. 1950).
179. 173 F.2d 587 (6th Cir. 1949).
180. 286 U.S. 417 (1932).
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Income taxes must be paid on income received (or accrued) during an
annual accounting period. [citation omitted] and see Burnet v. Sanford
Brooks Co., 282 U. S. 359, 363. The "claim of right" interpretation of the
tax laws has long been used to give finality to that period, and is now
deeply rooted in the federal tax system. See cases collected in 2 Mertens,
Law of Federal Income Taxation, § 12.103. We see no reason why the
Court should depart from this well-settled interpretation merely because
it results in an advantage or disadvantage to a taxpayer.18 1
The claim of right doctrine applies differently when the repayment
occurs in the same taxable year as receipt.18
Fabricated Doctrine tells us that "the principles of general justice
applied in cases such as Gargaro and Lewis discussed above do not extend
to all cases to which the unwind doctrine has been applied." 83 It goes on to
suggest that a court might be sympathetic to Mr. Poling (and other
taxpayers similarly situated) because of the argument that he returned his
bonus due to the strong public feeling that this was the correct moral
action, and that as a result, he should not face a negative tax consequence.
Further:
[a]ppeals to general notions of justice are unlikely, however, to be
sustained in other cases to which the unwind doctrine has applied, such
as cases where the reversal has been precipitated by unwise management
decisions or the taxpayer's regret about the tax consequences of the
original transaction. Considerations of justice in Gargaro and Lewis
would seem to allow unwind treatment only in cases only where the
unwind has moral value. 184
As discussed earlier,185 the opinions referred to here by Fabricated
Doctrineare opinions of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims in two cases that
were reversed by the Supreme Court in United States v. Lewis-an
unremarkable claim of right case.' 86 It is not clear what value these U.S.
Court of Federal Claims opinions have at all. Generally, lower court
opinions that are reversed because they are in clear conflict with Supreme
Court precedent would be considered minimally persuasive, if at all.
FabricatedDoctrine appears to be suggesting that some pro-unwinding
arguments might be beneficial if an appeal could be made to "justice" and
it could be argued that the desired unwinding "had moral value."' 87 As

181. 340 U.S. at 591-592.
182. See 25 T.C. 969 (1956).
183. FabricatedDoctrine, supra note 47, at 164.
184. Id.
185. See 173 F.2d 587 (6th Cir. 1949).
186. See id.

187. FabricatedDoctrine, supra note 47, at 164.
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explained below,' 88 this Article asserts that there is ample legal and policy
support for the rescission doctrine as articulated by Revenue Ruling 80-58,
and it is not believed that any appeal to abstract notions of justice or
morality are necessary.
Fabricated Doctrine next considers two cases, In re Trico Marine
Services'8 and Scallen v. Commissioner, 90 describing them as "cases that
mention Penn v. Robertson in dicta, and at best provide weak dicta support
for unwinding."l91 In Trico Marine Services, the court considered
plaintiffs motion to set aside the confirmation order. In discussing the
practical feasibility of unwinding the bankruptcy plan that had been
confirmed and carried out, the court stated:
Where property is sold or conveyed, and the transaction is then
rescinded, the rescission does not undo the tax effect of the initial
transaction unless two factors are present. First, the rescission must occur
in the same tax year as the initial transaction. [citing Penn v. Robertson,
115 F.2d 167, 175 (4th Cir.1940); and Rev. Rul. 80-58; other citations
omitted]. The rule is one of practicality, based on the annual accounting
principle that "requires the determination of income at the close of the
taxable year without regard to the effect of subsequent events." Penn,
115 F.2d at 175; accordSecurity FlourMills Co. v. C.I.R., 321 U.S. 281,

286, 64 S.Ct. 596, 88 L.Ed. 725 (1944). Second, the parties to the
transaction must be returned to the status quo ante. [citations omitted].192
As one can see, the court in Trico Marine Services cited Penn v.
Robertson as authority for one of the basic requirements for a valid
rescission. However, the court in Trico Marine Services held that no
rescission had occurred in that case because it was impossible to return the
parties to the status quo ante.

In Scallen, a corporation controlled by the taxpayer, Blue Ridge
Properties Corporation in, January 1979, sold a hotel and apartments (the
"Property") to Gerald R. Hansen. The next day, Hansen sold the Property
to Bradley A. Herman. On November 19, 1979, Herman sold the Property
to Campus Realty Corporation, another corporation controlled by the
taxpayer. The Commissioner argued that these transactions resulted in a
rescission of the January sale, and that the taxpayer, therefore, had no
capital gain or loss from that sale and had his historic basis in the Property.
The court noted that no gain would:
be recognized, however, if in the year of sale, the sale is rescinded and
188.
Correct
189.
190.
191.
192.

See Part V, infra The Rescission Doctrine as Currently Applied by the IRS is
and Would be Correct Even if Penn v. Robertson had Never Been Decided.
343 B.R. 68 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006).
54 T.C.M. (CCH) 177 (1987).
FabricatedDoctrine, supra note 47, at 148.
343 B.R. at 73.
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the taxpayer accepts reconveyance of the property and returns the
buyer's funds. Penn v. Robertson, 115 F.2d 167 (4th Cir. 1940). We
agree with respondent's statement of the law, but we do not agree that a
rescission occurred on these facts. 93
The court disagreed with the Commissioner because it was unwilling to
disregard the corporate form of Blue Ridge Properties Corporation or
Campus Realty Corporation. The court also stated that there was no
agreement for rescission characterizing the transactions as a rescission
would require disregarding the sale on February 1, 1979 from Hansen to
Herman, and the Commissioner had offered no argument that that should
be done. Once again, the court in Scallen cited Penn v. Robertson as
authority but held that no rescission had occurred on the facts before it.
In Hutcheson v. Commissioner,194 the taxpayer sold Wal-Mart stock in
January 1989 and repurchased an equivalent amount of stock in December,
1989. While the court applied the principles of Rev. Rul. 80-58, the court
unremarkably held that no rescission had taken place because the stock
acquired in December was not the same stock that was sold in January.
In Estate ofL. E. Crellin v. Commissioner,19 5 the directors of a California
personal holding corporation received erroneous advice from the
corporation's Certified Public Accountant ("CPA"). The CPA advised the
directors that the corporation would be subject to the personal holding
company . surtax unless the directors declared and distributed to the
corporation's shareholders a dividend approximately equal in amount to a
capital gain the corporation had received earlier in the year the dividend
was paid. Later, in the same year, the directors learned that the CPA's
advice was erroneous and passed a resolution purporting to rescind the
dividend and directing that a demand be sent to the shareholders for return
of the amounts paid to them. All of the shareholders returned the
dividends. All of these events-the dividend, the resolution rescinding the
dividend, and the repayment of the dividends by the shareholdersoccurred in the same year.1 9 6 As Sheldon Banoff demonstrates in his
seminal article on rescissions, 197 except in the case of dividends mistakenly
paid because of a scrivener's error, taxpayers cannot avoid dividend
income by voluntarily repaying the dividends. In this case, the corporation
had no right to enforce its demand that the shareholders repay the
dividends, and the court held for the Commissioner. However, in so
holding, the court noted, by contrasting the case of a compelled repayment
193. 54 T.C.M. at 205.
194. 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 2425 (1996).
195. 203 F.2d 812 (1953).
196. 203 F.2d at 813.
197. Banoff, supra note 45, at 981.
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of a dividend that "when payment and return of the dividend occur within
the same taxable year, it is reasonable to view the transaction as involving
no increment to gross income, rather than an increment to gross income
plus a deduction." Although this statement is plainly dicta, it suggests that
the court would not be unfriendly to a taxpayer arguing for rescission
treatment on facts like those for 1931 in Penn v. Robertson, and that the
court would not be applying a deduction rationale to a same-year
unwinding.
In Branum v. Campbell,198 pursuant to a contract effective April 1, 1948,
the taxpayer sold a 50% interest in a brokerage business to C. T. Green for
$15,000. The contract provided that the taxpayer and Green were to
operate the business as a partnership for an indefinite term unless
terminated by operation of law or by agreement of the parties. On
September 30, 1948, the taxpayer and Green entered into a second contract
providing for the dissolution of the partnership and the payment of $15,000
from the taxpayer to Green for Green's interest in the partnership.
The taxpayer contended that he had no gain or loss on the transaction.
He claimed that he had initially sold the business with the understanding
that, if the partnership arrangement proved unsatisfactory, he would
reimburse Green, as he claimed to do. The IRS did not accept this
explanation. In concluding that a completed sale, separate and distinct
from the partnership dissolution, had occurred, the court reasoned:
The words and the tenor of the contract are definite. There is no
reservation of title and no indication of a conditional or provisional
agreement between the parties . . There is no mention of an oral
agreement [to unwind] . . . in the contract.... We think the evidence

amply supports the findings by the court below that there was a
completed sale[.]
One wonders what the result in Branum would have been had the
taxpayer and Green entered into a contract rescinding the sale of the
taxpayer's 50% interest in his brokerage business to Green instead of, as
they did, agreeing to dissolve the partnership. Indeed, the IRS views
Branum as a case that "while on the facts not holding that a rescission has
taken place, acknowledges the principle that rescission in the year of sale
will extinguish otherwise taxable gain."l99
FabricatedDoctrine has the following observation about Branum:

Commentary has implied that the taxpayer's argument might have fared
better had the unwind transaction been "styled as a rescission." However,
Crellin's Estate above suggests that even if the taxpayer in Branum v.
198. 211 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1954).
199. The author acknowledges relying on Banoff's description of Branum for the
discussion above. Banoff, supra note 45, supra, at 961.
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Campbell had labeled the repurchase of his partnership interest a
"rescission" of the original sale, the court would have looked beyond the
label to the substance which in this case was not a true rescission but, as
the court noted, "separate and distinct." 200
What the court in Branum said were "separate and distinct" were the
taxpayer's sale of one-half of his business and the later dissolution of his
partnership with the purchaser. If, instead of dissolving their partnership,
the taxpayer and Green had agreed that Green would return the one-half of
the brokerage business to the taxpayer that Green had purchased and that
the taxpayer would return Green's purchase price, the taxpayer might have
been able to argue successfully for rescission. One issue, given the nature
of the business, would have been whether the parties could have been put
back in the status quo ante. Another potential issue is whether the
applicable partnership law would have allowed the transaction to be a
rescission of the sale of the brokerage business. In any event, such a
recasting of the transaction would have been more than a different styling
like that dismissed above by FabricatedDoctrine. Moreover, Fabricated
Doctrine's reference to Crellin 's Estate is improvident; as discussed above,
voluntary repayment of dividends is always ineffective to avoid taxation.201
The rules are different for other types of voluntary unwindings, like the
repayment of a bonus.202
E. Policy Analysis in FabricatedDoctrine
In its last four pages, FabricatedDoctrine states its conclusion and
discusses some policy issues. First, it states:
The IRS should revoke its mistaken ruling, or to the extent that any
ambiguity in the ruling allows it to be applied in ways that are not legally
correct, should correct that ambiguity. The Treasury Regulations state
that "the purpose of publishing revenue rulings ... is to promote correct
and uniform application of the tax laws by Internal Revenue Service
employees and to assist taxpayers in attaining maximum voluntary
compliance." Rev. Rul. 80-58 currently violates this regulation because it
promulgates an incorrect interpretation of the tax law set out in Penn v.
Robertson.203
In the second sentence of the above quotation, FabricatedDoctrine cites
Treasury Regulation Section 601.601(d)(2)(iii) correctly. However,
Fabricated Doctrine should have also considered Treasury Regulation
Section 601.601(d)(2)(i)(a), which states: "A Revenue Ruling is an official

200.
201.
202.
203.

FabricatedDoctrine, supra note 47, at 160.
See Note 196, supra, and accompanying text.
See Note 152, supra, and accompanying text.
FabricatedDoctrine, supra note 47, at 163 (footnotes omitted).
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interpretation by the Service that has been published in the Internal

Revenue Bulletin. Revenue Rulings are issued only by the National Office
and are published for the information and guidance of taxpayers, Internal
Revenue Service officials, and others concerned." 2 04 Therefore, the
question isn't just whether Revenue Ruling 80-58 is a correct interpretation
of Penn v. Robertson, although this Article submits that it is, the question is
whether Revenue Ruling is a correct interpretation of the law. As this
Article summarizes below, 20 5 there are other legal and policy bases for
Revenue Ruling 80-58. In this regard, it should be noted that Fabricated
Doctrine also makes an incorrect statement in its footnote to the last
sentence of the above quote which states: "While section 7805(b) gives the
I.R.S. some discretion in enforcing the code, Revenue Ruling 80-58 does
not purport to rely on discretion.",2 06 It is elementary that an official need
not refer to his or her grant of discretion to take action based on that grant.
Moreover, if Revenue Ruling 80-58 is viewed as a statement by the IRS
that it will not challenge taxpayers who take the position on facts
substantially similar to those in Situation 1 of Revenue Ruling 80-58 that
they have engaged in valid rescissions for tax purposes, Revenue Ruling
80-58 could be viewed as an agency non-enforcement decision that is not
subject to judicial review.207
Momentarily, it appears that FabricatedDoctrine is on the right track
when it states that:
Perhaps the most promising principled basis for the unwind doctrine is
the idea that tax law should follow economic substance, coupled with the
tax year accounting principle in Saunders v. Commissioner. Perhaps tax
law should strive, where possible, to base legal outcomes on the net
change in taxpayers economic positions during the tax year, ignoring
interim changes in legal and economic position. A uniform application of
this principle however would have implications somewhat more radical
than allowing taxpayers to claim unwind treatment at their discretion; it
would require that treatment in every relevant case, and would further
indicated a broader move towards reporting of net tax positions only at
year end.2 0 8

Saunders is a very short opinion in a claim of right case and does not
mention a "tax year accounting principle" or any other accounting principal
or concept. The remainder of the quoted paragraph could only be written
by persons who have no understanding of the annual accounting concept as
204. Treas. Reg. § 601.601(d)(2)(i)(a) (1987) (emphasis added).
205. See Part V, infra The Rescission Doctrine as Currently Applied by the IRS is
Correct and Would be Correct Even if Penn v. Robertson had Never Been Decided.
206. FabricatedDoctrine, supra, note 47, n. 185.
207. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
208. FabricatedDoctrine, note 47, supra, at 164-165.
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it has developed in U.S. federal income tax law. Moreover, Fabricated
Doctrine shows its misunderstanding of the federal tax system by stating
that taxpayers are now allowed "to claim unwind treatment at their
discretion." If a taxpayer's sale were rescinded on facts that would come
within Situation 1 of Revenue Ruling 80-58, the taxpayer's failure to treat
the sale as rescinded would no doubt be challenged by the IRS if the
taxpayer were audited. 2 0 9 Also, when do the authors of FabricatedDoctrine
think taxpayers report their taxable income if not at the end of each year?
Fabricated Doctrine also proceeds immediately to undercut its own
suggestion by discussing Hasen's comprehensive but highly theoretical
article: 2 10 "Furthermore, it is not clear that an economic substance approach
would necessarily support the unwind doctrine. Hasen, in Unwinding
Unwinding, created a theoretical framework for analyzing 'unwind' cases.
Hasen attempted to derive from the Haig-Simons economic income concept
principles for whether and when unwinding should be allowed."2 1 1
Hasen's discussion of the Haig-Simons conception of income is, in part,
as follows:
The Haig-Simons conception of income, named after the two theorists
who are credited with having articulated it, defines income as the net
change in a taxpayer's wealth (including wealth spent on consumption)
during the tax period. The occurrence or not of transactions is irrelevant
to the amount of the taxpayer's income or loss and, therefore, to the
amount of income tax liability the taxpayer has during the tax period.
Thus, the Haig-Simons definition takes into account the net appreciation
and depreciation of assets held during the tax period, without regard to
whether the assets are retained or sold. For example, whether or not A
sells Blackacre on December 31, her tax liability for the year ending on
that date is the same, because the increase or decline in value of
Blackacreis definitive of whether she has taxable income or loss.2 12
Most readers will note right away that our income tax system is not
based on Haig-Simons, as Hasen notes:
[T]he Haig-Simons concept does not, in fact, supply the normative
definition of income under the actual income tax. For one thing, the
actual tax has always incorporated a realization requirement for most
forms of income, and likely always will. Moreover, the historical
justification for the income tax has more to do with practical ability-topay concepts than with the ideal of taxing Haig-Simons income. Actual
ability to pay hinges in some measure on liquidity and valuation, two
problems for a Haig-Simons tax that a realization-based income tax
209. See Scallen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.M. at 205.
210. See FabricatedDoctrine, supra note 47, at 165 (citing Hasen, supra note 43).
211.

Id.

212.

Hasen, supra note 43, at 897-98.
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largely solves. 213

And Hasen further notes: "[fjrom a Haig-Simons perspective, the nontaxation of accrued but unrealized gain or loss represents an
accommodation of the income tax to other exigencies, principally the
problems of valuation, liquidity, and political acceptability." 2 14
Hasen points out that rescission would be irrelevant in a Haig-Simons
system of taxation.215 But, as Hasen also notes in the above-quoted portions
of his article, we don't live in a Haig-Simons tax world. Accordingly,
rescission's lack of importance in a Haig-Simons system is irrelevant to
whether the current rescission doctrine of Revenue Ruling 80-58 is good
policy.
FabricatedDoctrine also notes:
Hasen argued that "the substantive case for unwinding treatment is
comparatively weak" in situations where income tax consequences are
being unwound, as compared to situations where transactional taxes are
being unwound. The crux of his thesis is that:
the existence of the thing that is taxed-income-does not depend
on the fact of a transaction. Rather, the transaction provides the
occasion for imposing the tax now rather than at some other time;
the income (or loss), however, will generally be taken into account
eventually. Hence the availability of the unwind treatment should
not depend, even in the abstract, on the mere return to the status quo
ante, because such a return does not mean that nothing giving rise to
a tax has occurred. Hasen concludes that "any reversal, to merit
unwind treatment, ought to be allowed only if the mistake or error
giving rise to it is justified." 216
Hasen makes other interesting statements: The "rightness" of any given
rule in the abstract, however, is not the only consideration relevant to
shaping a well-conceived unwinding doctrine. A further and equally
significant consideration is consistency." 2 17
This Article submits that the annual accounting concept as applied in
Revenue Ruling 80-58 and the claim of right cases bring consistency to tax
law. Moreover, although FabricatedDoctrine is correct that Hasen views
the justification for allowing rescission treatment in income tax cases as
comparatively weaker than for transactional tax cases, he nowhere attempts
to quantify the difference, and he concludes his article by stating that
rescissions will very likely continue to be allowed on some basis in income

213.

Id. at 899.

214.

Id. at 898.

215.
216.

See id.
Fabricated Doctrine, note 47, supra, at 165.

217. Hasen, supra note 43, at 904 (emphasis added).
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tax cases. 2 18 However, Hasen also discusses tax benefit rule cases and claim
of right cases in connection with rescission and makes the following
observation:
If the compulsory nature of a reversal is considered one of the necessary
conditions of unwind treatment, then Revenue Ruling 80-58 is overbroad
in permitting unwinds in the same taxable year as the original
transaction, regardless of whether the reversal is a product of the
taxpayer's choice. On the other hand, if the sanctity of the annual
accounting principle provides the basis for according or denying
unwinding relief, it is unclear why the principle does not also govern
claim of right and TBR cases, at least where the error giving rise to the
later-year adjustment concerns the tax a er's knowledge of underlying
facts that themselves have not changed.
The tax benefit rule ("TBR") provides that if a taxpayer recovers an
expense or loss that was written off against a previous year's income, the
recovered amount must be included in income in the year of recovery.
Frequently recurring tax benefit situations are the inclusion of a prior bad
debt deduction upon the unexpected repayment of the debt, and the
inclusion in income of amounts previously deducted as losses under
Section 165 when the amounts have been unexpectedly recovered. 22 0 The
claim of right cases hold that if a taxpayer receives income in one year
without any restriction on the taxpayer's use of the income, the full amount
of the income must be included in the year of receipt notwithstanding a
possibility that the taxpayer might be required to repay some or all of the
income in the future.22 1
It is unclear why application of the annual accounting concept should
change the treatment of tax benefit cases or claim of right cases. The
annual accounting concept provides that a taxpayer's income for a taxable
year is computed on the basis of the facts at the end of the year.2 2 2 If the
facts existing at the end of a taxpayer's tax year support the taking of a loss
deduction or require the inclusion of income received under a claim of
right, then that is the mandated result, and a taxpayer is not permitted to
218. Id. at 942 ("These considerations do not imply that unwinding should be
unavailable under an income tax. They only indicate that the case for income tax
unwinding is weaker than the case for transactional taxes. The possibility of evasion or
avoidance may be a cost worth bearing, especially if the contexts in which unwinding
is deemed a permissible remedy are sufficiently salient to the tax authority that the
worry about evasion is minimal, the options for avoidance are minimized, or both.").
219. Id. at 923.

220. Id. at 906. See Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(d)(2)(iii) (1977). (specifying that the rule
applies to unexpected recoveries of losses that were reasonably but erroneously
deducted in a prior taxable year).
221. United States v. Lewis, 340 U.S. 590, 591-592.
222. Note 39, supra, and accompanying text.
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reopen a prior year on the ground that the relevant facts have changed since
the end of that year. On the other hand, the rescission treatment allowed by
Rev. Rul. 80-58 is consistent with the annual accounting concept, in that
the rescission must take place in the same tax year as the transaction that is
being rescinded; thus, the facts at the end of the tax year include the fact of
the rescission. In connection with his argument that the annual accounting
principle, if applied to tax benefit cases and claim of right cases in the same
way it is applied to rescissions, would change the treatment of those cases,
Hasen states: "For example, it is not clear why a deduction should be tan
item that she included in a prior year." 2 23 This statement seems incorrect. If
the taxpayer in a prior year included as income an amount the taxpayer did
not actually receive, the annual accounting principle would say that that
amount should not have been included in income in the prior year and the
taxpayer's remedy should be limited to filing an amended return that would
report taxable income correctly for the prior year based on the facts
existing at the end of that year (although misapprehended by the taxpayer).
FabricatedDoctrine then refers to another article by Banoff, in which he
discusses policy arguments both for and against permitting retroactive
unwinding, including the argument against, that "approval of retroactive
unwindings that are tax motivated permits taxpayers to play the audit
lottery: If you are audited, only then do you unwind to avoid adverse tax
results."224 With respect to Banoff, under the present state of authority on
rescission, it is unclear how one could play the audit lottery. If a taxpayer
waits until he or she is audited, it will -be impossible to carry out an
unwinding in the same year as the transaction desired to be unwound.
FabricatedDoctrine continues:
The unwind doctrine may similarly dilute the deterrent effect of the
codified economic substance doctrine in section 17709(o) [sic] by
allowing taxpayers to undertake transactions that may risk falling foul of
that doctrine knowing that they can be rescinded later in the tax year if
they receive advice that it would certainly fall foul of section 17709(o)
[sic]. 225

FabricatedDoctrine's references to "section 17709(o)" [sic] appear to
be intended to be references to I.R.C. Section 7701(o), which defines the
"economic substance doctrine" as "the common law doctrine under which
tax benefits under Subtitle A with respect to a transaction are not allowable
if the transaction does not have economic substance or lacks a business

223. Hasen, note 43, supra, at 923, n. 213.
224. FabricatedDoctrine, supra note 47, at 165-66 (citing Sheldon I. Banoff, New
IRS Rulings Approve Rescission Transactions That Change an Entity's Status, 105 J.
TAX'N 5, 6 (2006)).
225. Id. at 166.
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purpose."22 6 I.R.C Section 7701(o) also states rules for determining if
economic substance exists. I.R.C. Section 6662 imposes penalties. I.R.C.
Section 6662(a) imposes a penalty of 20% of the portion of any
underpayment attributable to any of various defined actions, including any
disallowance because a transaction lacks economic substance "within the
meaning of section 7701(o) or failing to meet the requirements of any
similar rule of law." 2 27 If a transaction that does not have economic
substance is not disclosed in the taxpayer's return, the penalty increases to
40%.228 It is clear that almost all unwinding transactions will have
economic substance because the very nature of an unwinding transaction
that comes within Revenue Ruling 80-58 is that the parties will have
changed their economic position in a meaningful way-either by undoing a
sale of property or by giving up the right to income. Also, it appears
unlikely that a taxpayer who enters into a transaction lacking economic
substance would see the light, if at all, within the period during which a
valid rescission can be undertaken in compliance with Revenue Ruling 8058. In any case, the purpose of I.R.C. Sections 7701(o) and 6662 would
appear to be to deter taxpayers from entering into transactions that lack
economic substance. Accordingly, if a taxpayer were to rescind a
transaction because the taxpayer feared that the transaction would be found
to lack economic substance, it would seem that I.R.C. Sections 7701(o) and
6662 would have achieved their purpose.
FabricatedDoctrinecontinues its argument by stating:
Hasen further notes that the ability to unwind transactions in the manner
allowed by Rev. Rul. 80-58 facilitates the problem of government
'whipsaw,' when the property transferred subject to an "unwinding has
depreciated or depreciated [sic] over the course of the tax year." Each of
these effects may mean that unwinding is a drain on the revenue.229
Any potential whipsaw problem appears to be de minimus because
taxpayers do not have that much time to decide whether to rescind a
transaction. Moreover, if taxpayer A sells property to taxpayer B in
January 2014, and the parties rescind the sale before the end of 2014, the
sale in January 2014, is disregarded under Revenue Ruling 80-58, and
taxpayer A is treated as having owned the property all the time after the
disregarded sale. Accordingly, any deductions attributable to the property
would belong to taxpayer A, and taxpayer B would not be entitled to claim
them. How does one determine if rescissions or any other activity is "a
drain on the revenue"? Is there some knowable level of revenue belonging
226. I.R.C. § 7701(o)(5)(A) (2012).

227. I.R.C. § 6662(b)(6) (2012).
228. I.R.C. § 6662(i) (2012).
229. FabricatedDoctrine, supra note 47, at 166.
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to the federal government that may be drained? Further, although Hasen
does note that some whipsaw may occur, for him the possible whipsaw
arises because taxpayers may conduct their affairs so as to avoid Revenue
Ruling 80-58 when it is advantageous to do so, and comply when it is
favorable. 23 0 Hasen also notes that our self-reporting system contributes to
whipsaw. 23 1 Both of these concerns apply to our tax system generally and
not the peculiar disadvantages of the unwinding doctrine of Revenue
Ruling 80-58. Indeed, in another part of his article, Hasen discusses that
when a taxpayer successfully avoids having to report gain on a rescinded
sale, the taxpayer often will have more taxable income in future years than
would be the case if the rescission had not occurred.2 32
V. THE RESCISSION DOCTRINE AS CURRENTLY APPLIED BY THE IRS is
CORRECT AND WOULD BE CORRECT EVEN IF PENN V. ROBERTSON HAD
NEVER BEEN DECIDED

This Article attempts to demonstrate that Penn v. Robertson in fact offers
strong support for the rescission doctrine articulated by Revenue Ruling
80-58 and that the authors of FabricatedDoctrine have completely failed
in their attempt to show that the IRS fabricated the rescission doctrine in
Revenue Ruling 80-58 and that everyone else has misread Penn v
Robertson. Penn v. Robertson clearly characterizes the income realized by
Mr. Penn early in 1931 as having been extinguished by his executors'
agreeing to return his credits later in 1931. FabricatedDoctrine attempts
unsuccessfully to show that the court in Penn v. Robertson was operating
under a deduction rationale, but those attempts, as this Article
demonstrates, were based on an incredible misreading of the opinion. 2 33
Nowhere in its opinion does the court in Penn v. Robertson give any
indication that when it said that it agreed with the district court "the
rescission in 1931 before the close of the calendar year extinguished what
otherwise would have been taxable income to Penn for that year"2 34 that it
was really saying that what would otherwise have been taxable income to
Mr. Penn was extinguished because it had been reduced to zero by a
deduction. In addition to their fundamentally flawed reading of the opinion
in Penn v. Robertson, the authors of FabricatedDoctrine only attempted to
analyze half of the problem. Revenue Ruling 80-58 cited two grounds for
its holdings-one was Penn v. Robertson and the other (cited first in
230. Hasen, supra note 43, at 940-41.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 901.
233. See supra Part IV Subsection B Fabricated Doctrine's Analysis of Penn v.
Robertson.
234. Penn v. Robertson 115 F.2d 167, 175 (4th Cir. 1940).
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Revenue Ruling 80-58) was the annual accounting principle as established
by the Supreme Court cases discussed above in Part II. Ultimately,
however, even if the authors of FabricatedDoctrine were correct in their
assertion that Penn v. Robertson provides no support for the rescission
doctrine as currently applied by the IRS, that doctrine would be correct as a
matter of policy and would be within the authority of the Treasury
Department and the. IRS. Section 7801 of the Internal Revenue Code
authorizes and directs the Treasury Department to perform the
"administration and enforcement" of the income and transfer tax
provisions, and Section 7805 authorizes and directs the prescription "of all
needful rules and regulations." The Treasury has delegated this authority
to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.235
In other words, assume that Penn v. Robertson had never been decided
and that taxpayers were just now approaching the IRS with questions about
the tax treatment of transactions that had been unwound. Can anyone
doubt that Sections 7801 and 7805 provide ample authority for the IRS to
look at the Supreme Court cases defining and discussing the annual
accounting concept, and, on the basis of the annual accounting concept,
promulgate a revenue ruling articulating the same rescission doctrine as
Revenue Ruling 80-58?236 The Court in Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co.
observed that "all revenue acts ... since the adoption of the Sixteenth
Amendment have uniformly assessed the tax on the basis of annual returns
showing the net result of all the taxpayer's transactions during a fixed
accounting period." 2 3 7 The Court quoted this statement approvingly in
1944,238 and, in 1953, it stated that "Congress has enacted an annual
accounting system under which income is counted up at the end of each
year."239
The annual accounting concept is the common policy thread running
through Penn v. Robertson, Revenue Ruling 80-58, and the claim of right
cases. As discussed earlier, the claim of right cases teach us that if a
taxpayer receives income in the tax year 2014 with no restrictions of the
taxpayer's right to retain or use the income, if the taxpayer is required to
repay all or a portion of the income in a later tax year, the taxpayer cannot
reopen the 2014 tax year to reduce the taxpayer's income in 2014, but
rather is only allowed a deduction in the year of repayment. The claim of
Treas. Reg. § 301.7805-1.
236. See Note 1, supra, and accompanying text. In 2013, the Internal Revenue
Service reaffirmed that Revenue Ruling 80-58 is its guidance on rescissions-see notes
235.

18-19, supra, and accompanying text).

237. 282 U.S. at 363 (emphasis added).
238. Security Flour Mills Co. v. Commissioner, 321 U.S. 281, 285 (1944).
239.

Healy v. Commissioner, 345 U.S. 278, 284 (1953) (emphasis added).
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right cases also teach us, however, that if the taxpayer in this example
repays all or a portion of the income in the year of receipt, 2014, the
repayment reduces the taxpayer's reportable taxable income in 2014,
whether the repayment is voluntary or involuntary; it is a reduction in
reportable taxable income, not the allowance of a deduction. Fabricated
Doctrine does not offer any analysis of the annual accounting concept.
Indeed, in its discussion of the potential tax treatment of Douglas Poling,
without any consideration of how the annual accounting concept might
apply, FabricatedDoctrine assumes away any potential deductibility of a
repayment by Mr. Poling of his TARP bonus, fails to discuss the authorities
discussed above 24 0 that show that if Mr. Poling did repay his TARP bonus
in the year of receipt, he would be allowed to exclude the repaid bonus
from his taxable income for that year, and wrongly states that Mr. Polling
would likely be entitled to treat repayment as a rescission under Revenue
Ruling 80-58.
A fundamental difference between this Article and FabricatedDoctrine
is that this Article believes the annual accounting concept is an important
policy concept that supports the rescission doctrine as developed by
Revenue Ruling 80-58. FabricatedDoctrine does not discuss the annual
accounting concept or even acknowledge that it was one ground cited by
Revenue Ruling 80-58 as authority for its holdings.24 1 Under the annual
accounting concept, a deductible expense paid (if the taxpayer uses the
cash basis of accounting) or incurred (if the taxpayer uses the accrual
method of accounting) on December 31, 2014 may reduce taxable income
realized on January 1 2014. What policy argument suggests that it is
inappropriate to say that a sale closed in January, 2014 that is unwound in
December 2014 does not have to reported on the taxpayer's return for
2014? Similarly, what policy is there that would state that it is
inappropriate to say that a taxpayer who receives taxable compensation in
January 2014 does not have to report the income to the extent the taxpayer
repays the compensation to the employer before the end of 2014? As
discussed in more detail above,242 it is no answer, particularly in the case
of an unwound sale of a capital asset, to assert that a deduction puts the
taxpayer in the same position as an unwinding and that therefore a
deduction rationale is just as likely or, as FabricatedDoctrine argues, more
likely the basis for the holding with respect to the tax year 1931 in Penn v.
Robertson as is the rescission doctrine.
240. See supra Part IV, Subsection C Fabricated Doctrine's Examination of TARP
Bonuses.
241. Rev. Rul. 80-58, supra note 1.
242. Fabricated Doctrine, supra note 47 at 142; see note 90, supra, and
accompanying text.
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This Article has demonstrated that Fabricated Doctrine's
recommendation that Revenue Ruling 80-58 be revoked rests entirely on a
fundamentally flawed analysis of Penn v. Robertson. Penn v. Robertson in
fact provides ample legal support for Revenue Ruling 80-58. Moreover,
Revenue Ruling 80-58 is supported by the U.S. Supreme Court cases
establishing the annual accounting concept, and Revenue Ruling 80-58's
permitting a rescission of a sale in the same taxable year is completely
consistent with the annual accounting concept.
Although the IRS
confirmed in 2013 that Revenue Ruling 80-58 will continue indefinitely to
be its position on rescissions, 24 3 it would be beneficial if the IRS would
relax its current no-ruling policy on rescissions and provide guidance on
questions like those raised in the NYSBA Report. If time and energy could
be found, a wide-ranging discussion of the best policies to apply to
rescissions, tax benefit cases, and claim of right cases, as Hasen attempted
in his article, would also be beneficial. In an age when information
abounds on the Internet and researchers face difficulties in assuring that
they have thoroughly researched a topic, articles like FabricatedDoctrine
that appear in facially creditable publications present a danger and do a
disservice to scholarship in a complicated field that could benefit from
thoughtful analysis.

243.

Notes 18-19, supra, and accompanying text.

